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Abstract
Why do ethnically diverse elites share power in government coalitions? I argue that uncer-
tainty about their societal support makes ethnic leaders frequently form oversized coalitions
when their group does not represent an overwhelming majority. This uncertainty stems from
cross-cutting cleavage configurations, which enable coethnics to hold membership in multiple
groups, and opens up the possibility of future defection to the opposition along shared identity
markers. In response, elites prefer coalitions that internalize cross-cutting cleavages as they re-
strict defections to coalition partners and survive longer. To test these hypotheses, I collected
new data on linguistic, religious, and racial intra-group divisions. Using conditional choice
models on formation opportunities in 134 ethnically divided societies between 1946 and 2009
I find that, independent of institutional rules, ethnic elites frequently opt for oversized multi-
ethnic coalitions that share as many ethnic markers as possible. These coalitions survive longer
than more heterogeneous pacts.
KEYWORDS: coalition formation, coalition duration, cross-cutting cleavages, ethnic identity,
power-sharing
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Why do ethnically diverse elites share power in coalitions?1 This is a central question for schol-
ars who study the prevention and resolution of civil wars (Lijphart, 1977; Walter, 2002; Hartzell
and Hoddie, 2007) and policy-makers concerned with violent conflicts in ethnically divided so-
cieties such as South Sudan and Iraq.2 The composition of the ruling coalition also influences
important outcomes such as economic growth (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003), authoritarian
regime stability (Pepinsky, 2009), and patronage politics (Chandra, 2004). Studying the origins of
ethnic power-sharing is of particular interest because conventional wisdom holds that it should be
very difficult to accomplish. Students of ethnically divided societies conceptualize political elites
and their coethnic supporters as rational actors who want to maximize their own share of power
(e.g., Posner, 2005), or even subordinate members of other groups (Horowitz, 2000). In the ab-
sence of institutional rules such as guaranteed government inclusion, minimum-winning coalitions
or even minority rule should predominate in ethnically divided societies due to ethnic outbidding
(Horowitz, 1993; Rabushka and Shepsle, 2008). The resulting large-scale ethnic exclusion is a
fertile breeding ground for violent conflicts (see Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013).
Yet despite an extensive literature that links so-called power-sharing institutions such as pro-
portional representation (PR) or authoritarian parties to desirable outcomes including stability and
economic growth (e.g., Norris, 2008; Gandhi, 2008), relatively little evidence exists that the same
institutions affect the formation of multiethnic coalitions. In fact, Figure 1 shows no link between
institutions and multiethnic coalitions.3 The frequency of multiethnic coalitions in 2009 (grey
bars) exceeds the frequency of single-group rule (black) in states without power-sharing institu-
tions (left) while the pattern reverses in states with power-sharing institutions (right). The absence
of multiethnic coalitions in many countries with power-sharing institutions calls into question the
1I use the terms coalition and power-sharing to denote any national government, such as com-
munist central committees, military juntas, or presidential cabinets, that consists of leaders of more
than one ethnic group. In contrast, I refer to executive bodies dominated by representatives of one
ethnic group as monoethnic or single-group rule.
2These are multiethnic states where politicians make ethnic claims in national politics.
3My operationalization of power-sharing institutions follows the literatures on conflict reso-
lution (Horowitz, 2002; Lijphart, 2002) and authoritarian politics (Boix and Svolik, 2013, 307),
and encompasses any of the following formal rules: PR, the alternative vote, or parliamentary
government in democracies, and parliaments or parties in autocracies.
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hypothesized effectiveness of these institutions. That elites form multiethnic coalitions where no
power-sharing institutions exist demands a new explanation.
Figure 1: Power-sharing institutions in 2008 and ethnic regime type in 2009. Data on power-
sharing institutions comes from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) and Bormann and Golder
(2013). Data on ethnic coalitions comes from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset by Cederman,
Wimmer and Min (2010).
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In this study, I argue that political elites frequently form oversized multiethnic coalitions due
to incomplete information about their true support and the anticipation of impending challenges
to their rule. Uncertainty over their own strength compels elites to ensure themselves against the
risk of coups and rebellions, party splits and uncertain elections. This unertainty arises from intra-
group conflict and defections (Kalyvas, 2008; McLauchlin and Pearlman, 2012). It is particularly
severe when cross-cutting cleavages endow individuals with membership in multiple groups, for
example when speakers of one language subscribe to the same religious attributes as members of
another linguistic group (Posner, 2005; Chandra, 2012). Although individuals cannot just claim
membership in any identity group, shifts in salient group boundaries can transform bare majorities
into minorities. These realignments occur, for example, when a subset of ruling elites offers pre-
viously excluded group leaders a new pact along cross-cutting cleavages that gives the defectors
greater influence in the new government coalition. In response, ruling elites generally seek se-
cure majorities that survive defections by their supporters and prefer coalitions among groups with
shared identity attributes.4 Governments formed around cross-cutting cleavages feature a smaller
number of internal divisions, and correspondingly fewer opportunities for defection to the opposi-
4I define secure majorities as (1) oversized coalitions that exceed minimum-winning size, and
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tion. Therefore, more homogeneous government coalitions survive longer than those with greater
internal diversity at equal size.
The primary contribution of this study is to develop and test a novel mechanism of ethnic
coalition formation that emphasizes the interplay between ethnic elites and their supporters in the
presence of uncertainty-increasing cross-cutting cleavages. My argument draws on recent insights
into how the threat of violence creates self-enforcing power-sharing (Svolik, 2009, Roessler, 2016,
Ch.10), and adds that the position of elites can weaken when supporters defect. My study also
speaks to the debate between scholars who highlight how African leaders share power to deter re-
bellion (Rothchild and Foley, 1988; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015) and coups (Arriola, 2009),
and researchers who argue that leaders in divided societies exclude other ethnically distinct elites in
minority or minimum-winning coalitions (Horowitz, 2000; Rabushka and Shepsle, 2008; Roessler,
2011). Taking an intermediate position, I predict that, on average, leaders balance the costs of shar-
ing power too widely with the risk of losing power in minority and minimum-winning governments
by choosing oversized but not grand coalitions. Finally, building on existing work on ruling coali-
tions in Africa (Arriola, 2009; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015), I test the implications of my
argument for ethnic government formation and duration on a global sample.
I evaluate my hypotheses with the help of conditional choice models and semi-parametric du-
ration models on data of ethnic coalitions in 134 ethnically divided states from the Ethnic Power
Sharing (EPR) dataset (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). To explore the central cleavages
mechanism I introduce new data on ethnic groups’ linguistic, religious, and racial segments that
can cut across group boundaries. The statistical tests confirm my three main theoretical ex-
pectations. First, the results indicate that ethnic elites prefer oversized coalitions to minority,
minimum-winning, and grand coalitions regardless of the institutional rules in operation. Mo-
noethnic regimes are typical when the ruling group constitutes an overwhelming majority, and
leaders mostly fear internal challenges predicted by the commitment logic rather than rebellion or
supporter defections. Yet my sample includes as many oversized coalitions as monoethnic regimes,
and secure majorities are thus by far the most likely type of government in ethnically divided so-
(2) monoethnic rule by a group that includes an overwhelming majority (> 60%) of the population.
A minimum-winning government requires links to at least 50% of the population and includes the
minimum number of groups to pass this threshold.
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cieties while minority rule is rare. Second, ethnic elites prefer homogeneous coalitions around
cross-cutting cleavages as they anticipate shifts in salient identity markers and erect reinforcing
cleavages to excluded groups. Third, coalition governments are generally unstable but those which
internalize cross-cutting cleavages survive longer than those that do not. I conclude by illustrating
the logic of my theory in a case study of Indonesia.
Theory
Why do ethnic elites share power in coalition governments? Almost every theory of coalition
formation draws on Riker’s (1967) formative work that captures the importance of the distribu-
tion of power in the “size principle,” which predicts that utility-maximizing actors aim to form
minimum-winning coalitions. Later studies explore other aspects of coalitions in democracies
such as ideological congruence or proposal sequencing, but the relative power of actors remains
central (e.g., Axelrod, 1970; Baron and Ferejohn, 1989). Although empirical work on coalition for-
mation shows that minimum-winning governments are not ubiquitous, they constitute the modal
outcome in post-war European democracies (Golder, Golder and Siegel, 2012, 436).
In the context of ethnically divided societies, three expectations prevail. First, leaders of ma-
jority groups generally rule alone (Horowitz, 2002, 20, Rabushka and Shepsle, 2008, 91). Second,
minority rule prevails in the absence of majority groups and formal institutions that require or in-
centivize multiethnic coalitions (Horowitz, 2000, 433–434). Third, leaders only form coalitions
where institutional rules impose winning thresholds that no group manages to surpass on its own
(ibid., 369).5 This view underwrites analyses that attribute political violence and other suboptimal
social outcomes to the lack of cooperation between ethnically distinct groups (see, e.g., Alesina,
Baqir and Easterly, 1999; Roessler, 2011; Esteban, Mayoral and Ray, 2012).
In reaching these conclusions, existing work on ethnic power-sharing usually builds on three
central assumptions: (1) ethnic elites and their followers are utility-maximizing actors; (2) au-
thoritarian regimes and some democracies lack commitment technologies, that is mechanisms that
incentivize cooperation across ethnic boundaries; and (3) ethnic groups are homogeneous and uni-
fied actors.6 While I share the first assumption of utility-maximizing actors (also see Posner, 2005;
5Table A1 in the online appendix summarizes numerous studies making these predictions.
6I follow Weber (1978) in defining ethnicity as a “putative belief in common ancestry” that
builds on shared identity markers such as language, religion, caste, and race.
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Chandra, 2012; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015), I relax the remaining two statements.
With respect to commitment technologies, I assume that violent revolutions and coups in dicta-
torships serve as substitutes for elections and partisan defections in democracies (also see Bueno de
Mesquita et al., 2003; Svolik, 2009; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015).7 Most scholars agree that
democratic elections incentivize coalitions when elites lack a clear majority (Horowitz, 2002; Li-
jphart, 2002). However, in autocracies minority rule is the standard expectation (Horowitz, 1993,
21; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, 70; Rabushka and Shepsle, 2008, 90-1).
Yet upon closer inspection, ethnic minority regimes such as Assad’s Syria and Apartheid South
Africa constitute the exception rather than the rule. Opposition majorities successfully overthrew
minority regimes in Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Liberia, Uganda, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, and
seceded from Pakistan and Sudan. On average, larger excluded groups are more likely to violently
challenge the government directly than smaller groups (Buhaug, 2006) and “stronger rebels” are
more likely to win civil wars (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013, 196–198). Only if ethnic
minority governments, such as Ladinos in Guatemala, balance their demographic inferiority with
vast superiority in coercive capacity should they be able to defend their position in the long run. To
stay in power, incumbents in authoritarian “hegemonial exchange regimes” in Sub-Saharan Africa
share power in coalition governments “to reduce alienation and opposition” (Rothchild and Foley,
1988, 250). Even in dictatorships ethnic elites usually require the support from a majority of the
population due to the threat of violence from excluded groups.8
Nevertheless rational elites benefit less from holding office the more spoils they need to share
with their coalition partners. In contrast to theories focusing primarily on external and internal
threats to incumbent elites’ hold on power (Arriola, 2009; Roessler, 2011; Francois, Rainer and
Trebbi, 2015), my theory does not predict that leaders simply include all potential rivals and form
ever larger or grand coalitions. However, elites will not enjoy any spoils if they do not hold
7Conceptually, I distinguish autocracies and democracies by the method of leader selection and
the degree to which elites in most democratic regimes are accountable to their supporters.
8Since violence as a commitment device entails higher personal risks than losing elections, it
should deter potential defectors, and thus permit smaller coalitions than in democracies. Yet due
to weaker accountability mechanisms, authoritarian elites capture relatively larger rewards from
holding office than democratic politicians (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003, 22). With increasing
rewards, rebellion risk rises, and so does the need for larger coalitions.
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sufficient coercive capacity to obtain and defend their position. On average then, elites opt to first
secure their position in majority governments and then exclude as many groups as possible.
Uncertainty and coalitions
So far I have argued that ethnic elites are most likely to form majority-sized coalitions no matter the
institutional rules under which they operate. Yet even if ethnic leaders form majority governments,
existing theoretical models of coalition formation predict that these coalitions should be minimum-
winning (Riker, 1967). Therefore, a large number of ethnic groups should still be excluded from
power-sharing pacts. Research on civil war alliances (Christia, 2012) and government formation in
ethnically divided societies (Rabushka and Shepsle, 2008) supports the minimum-winning predic-
tion. However, the conditions under which Riker’s logic holds have received less attention in these
analyses. As discussed above, one central assumption that undergirds the minimum-winning logic
is that ethnic leaders obtain the full support from their coethnics and know how large this support
is (Riker, 1967, 47). With this fixed and indivisible conceptualization of ethnic groups, existing
research presupposes that ethnic elites have complete information over the distribution of power.
In contrast, I argue that ethnic groups are neither fixed nor indivisible units that support their
political elites unconditionally. Although ethnicity is probably the most common political cleavage
globally, the boundaries between ethnic groups are neither impenetrable nor unchangeable (Barth,
1969). Ethnic boundaries are least telling of political allegiance where identity markers allow
membership in multiple sub-groups. In these contexts, individuals stress the one identity marker
that guarantees their inclusion in the smallest possible winning coalition (Posner, 2005; van der
Veen and Laitin, 2012). This implies that political elites who draw on the support of their coethnics
to gain and stay in power operate in an environment of incomplete information: they only know
the approximate distribution of power gauged from the headcount of different ethnic groups.
There is ample evidence that group loyalties in multiethnic states do not always prove stable.
Recent research shows that ethnic voting becomes less likely when material benefits are neither
distributed along ethnics lines nor excludable (Dunning and Nilekani, 2013; Ichino and Nathan,
2013). Brass (1968) describes the fluidity of coalitions in Indian state parliaments, and Ferree
(2012) shows that governments in Sub-Saharan Africa that include ethnic groups with majority
sub-segments frequently experience volatility. Once the ethnic distribution of power becomes
uncertain, the minimum-winning logic no longer applies:
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The uncertainty of the real world and the bargaining situation forces coalition mem-
bers to aim at a subjectively estimated minimum-winning coalition rather than at an
actual minimum. In decision-systems large enough so that participants do not know
each other or what each is doing, the actual size and weight of a coalition may be
in doubt, if only because of . . . participants’ inability to estimate each other’s weights
(Riker, 1967, 77–78).
Riker’s quote captures the political competition in ethnically divided states where elites only
have an approximate sense of the strength of their support from group members. This uncertainty
stems from the lack of fixed group membership, which does not automatically translate into polit-
ical allegiance. Even in states where ethnic tensions run high, group members hardly ever throw
their support consistently behind just one ethnic organization (e.g., McLauchlin and Pearlman,
2012). As a consequence, political elites anticipate defections from their coethnic supporters and
allies, and rely on secure majorities. In nation-states, where one ethnic group constitutes a vast ma-
jority and regime-threatening rebellions are unlikely, leaders form monoethnic governments that
minimize the potential for splits and internal challenges. Where ethnic demography precludes such
arrangements, uncertainty is higher and leaders seek oversized coalitions that can deter rebellions
and survive defections.9
Ethnic cleavages’ effect on coalition formation and duration
Cleavage reconfiguration constitutes one of the major sources of uncertainty for ethnic leaders
regarding the strength of their support, and therefore proves crucial in forming governments and
maintaining coalitions. Whereas earlier work on ethnicity and cleavages emphasized rigidity and
lock-in of cleavages (Lijphart, 1977; Lipset and Rokkan, 1990 (1967)), more recent studies empha-
size how individuals alternate between highlighting one identity attribute such as their language
and another such as their religion (Chandra, 2004; Posner, 2005; van der Veen and Laitin, 2012).
If enough individuals activate an alternative identity attribute, they reconfigure state-wide cleavage
constellations (Chandra, 2012, 58–9). Then, a government majority on one ethnic dimension can
turn into a minority along another cleavage (Chandra, 2005, 243). Unlike creating new identities or
9A different type of uncertainty lies at the heart of the commitment problem logic, which high-
lights that ethnically distinct coalition partners do not know each others’ intentions and cannot
trust each other to continue cooperation (Svolik, 2009; Roessler, 2011).
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assimilating into another ethnic group, changing the salience of available ethnic attributes consti-
tutes a ‘legitimate’ defection because it aligns with preexisting identity markers.10 Where support
realignment threatens the survival of the ruling coalition, elites will act on it.
Aware of alternative majorities, excluded elites stress those cleavages that cross-cut the border
between the government coalition and the opposition in order to delegitimize their own exclusion.
In Zambia, politicians who are likely to lose elections during multiparty competition between
language groups, aim to activate latent tribal identities, which would upend linguistic majorities
(Posner, 2005, 192-4). Similarly, excluded elites in India attempt to activate new caste cleavages to
gain power Chandra (2004). This mechanism differs from ethnic outbidding, which pits moderates
against hardliners from the same group and aims at the exclusion of coalition partners. In fact, out-
bidding frequently occurs locally in Zambia, where competition centers on one ethnic dimension,
but not on the national level (Posner, 2005, 110). In contrast to competition over one cleavage,
multi-dimensional contests induce moderation (Chandra, 2005, 241).
Anticipating the threat of cleavage realignment, ruling elites attempt to undercut the emergence
of new salient ethnic dimensions through a variety of strategies including using state power to dis-
tribute patronage, discredit opposition politicians, and outright intimidate them. Yet even under
authoritarian rule, excluded elites can counter government power by mobilizing supporters on uni-
versity campuses and through religious networks (see Slater, 2009), or by relying on private-sector
funding (Arriola, 2012). This is why ruling elites try to preclude supporter defection by forming
coalitions around cross-cutting cleavages. For example, leaders of linguistic groups seek coali-
tion partners with whom they share religious and racial markers, thus minimizing intra-coalition
diversity.11 Simultaneously, ruling elites exclude groups that differ on a large number of ethnic
10It is conceivable that non-ethnic allegiances trump ethnic ones (e.g., Dunning and Nilekani,
2013), but most scholars assume that ethnic cleavages dominate non-ethnic divisions in their ability
to overcome collective action dilemmas (Horowitz, 2000). Yet Chandra (2005, 243) suggests
that the distinction between ethnic and non-ethnic cleavages blurs in environments with numerous
cross-cutting ethnic cleavages while Lupu and Riedl (2012, 1357) question the ability of ethnicity
to structure political space when uncertainty is high.
11Expelling coalition partners decreases coalition diversity but also increases civil war risk. The
mechanism of reducing internal diversity operates independent of coalition size by choosing coali-
tion partners with cross-cutting rather than reinforcing cleavages.
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dimensions, and thus reinforce the ethnic differences between the ruling coalition and the opposi-
tion. Where ethnic leaders succeed in forming coalitions that internalize cross-cutting cleavages,
support realignment may shift the balance of power within the government but not to the opposi-
tion. However, when leaders fail to internalize cross-cutting cleavages, opposition elites emphasize
dormant ethnic dimensions to shift away support from the ruling party or ambitious junior partners
inside the coalition seek outside support to improve their relative power.
Uncertainty about the loyalty of their supporters also affects government duration. High uncer-
tainty, often resulting from the expectation of instability, compels elites to form oversized coali-
tions to stabilize their own rule (Riker, 1967, 77-79; Slater and Simmons, 2012). Since elites form
larger coalitions in anticipation of instability, these coalitions are characterized by shorter survival
times than demographically dominant monoethnic regimes with few opportunities for defection.
My argument adds that coalitions with fewer ethnic dimensions survive longer because supporters
cannot defect as easily to the opposition.
I summarize my three central expectations in the following hypotheses:
H1 : Ethnic elites are more likely to form secure majorities than minimum-winning coalitions,
minority governments, and grand coalitions.
H2 : Ethnic elites are more likely to form coalitions around cross-cutting cleavages with few ethnic
dimensions than more heterogenous pacts.
H3 : The more cleavages divide a government the shorter its duration.
Alternative explanations
The commitment problem logic constitutes an important rival explanation for ethnic coalition for-
mation while also stressing the threat of violence as the main incentive for elites to overcome
mutual suspicion (e.g., Svolik, 2009; Dal Bó and Powell, 2009; Boix and Svolik, 2013). However,
these accounts primarily focus on the difficulties of elites to commit to future cooperation amongst
each other and disregard the relations between elites and their supporters. Emphasizing coup risk in
multiethnic coalitions, Roessler (2011) argues that the very tactics elites from one group employ to
prevent coups, appear to be threatening to coalition partners from another group. To preempt their
own exclusion, elites then expel their rivals from power, and should increasingly form monoethnic
and minority governments but not oversized coalitions (cf. Rabushka and Shepsle, 2008).
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While I do not negate the risk coups pose, I argue that elites usually form another oversized
coalition after deposing an opponent rather than moving towards monoethnic rule. Similarly, Ar-
riola (2009) and Roessler (2011, 325) describe diffusing power among many coalition partners as
a coup-proofing strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Roessler (2016, Ch.10) also demonstrates that
the commitment logic predicts stable power-sharing when the two largest groups in a country are
equally powerful. Roessler’s work then implies that oversized coalitions should be less likely in
democracies, where coups are less of a risk, and should mostly involve equally sized partners. If,
however, fear of cleavage reconfiguration drives elites, oversized coalitions should occur at similar
rates in democracies and autocracies, and be more unstable than predicted by Roessler.
The common solution to the commitment problem are institutions that allow elites to credibly
commit to power-sharing (e.g. Boix and Svolik, 2013). The capacity of state and non-state institu-
tions, rather than their type, likely affects coalition formation and duration but the direction of this
effect is not clear. Strong non-state organizations such as highly institutionalized party systems
and communist organizations could enable opposition politicians to activate dormant cleavage di-
mensions, or harden active ethnic and non-ethnic identities, and thus reduce the likelihood of
defections. Similarly, strong states have less of a need for oversized coalitions, yet also have the
power to integrate many elites in large coalitions as argued by Slater (2010). More clearly, strong
states should have more resources to withstand attempts of cleavage reconfiguration.
Another rival explanation highlights mutual cultural or policy preferences and trust as the main
impetus for elites, or their supporters, to prefer certain coalition partners over others. One ver-
sion of this argument points to greater cultural distance between racially distinct groups (Caselli
and Coleman, 2013) or religious traditions (Huntington, 1996); another emphasizes that common
identity markers imply shared policy preferences (Lieberman and McClendon, 2013). The cul-
tural distance logic implies that multiethnic coalitions are less likely across specific dimensions –
a claim I test below. Coalitions around shared identity markers may reduce policy differences and
mistrust relative to coalitions separated by multiple ethnic dimensions. However, the policy and
trust arguments still predict relatively small coalitions as each new member adds at least one more
ethnic marker. In contrast, my theory predicts oversized coalitions around cross-cutting cleav-
ages in anticipation of future defections and can thus account for supporter realignment detailed in
studies from Africa (Posner, 2005; Ferree, 2010) and Asia (Chandra, 2004; Horowitz, 2013).12
12It is possible that supporters do not defect because cross-cutting cleavages in the ruling coali-
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Research Design and Data
The analysis in this paper proceeds in three steps. The first two consist of quantitative analyses of
the government formation hypotheses (H1&2) and the duration hypothesis (H3) along with com-
peting explanations for each outcome. The last step illustrates my argument and scope conditions
with ethnic coalition dynamics in Indonesia. In what follows, I focus on the complex formation
stage, which forms the basis of the duration analysis.
While there are different ways to model ethnic power-sharing I build on Martin and Stevenson
(2001) and the literature on parliamentary government formation in using conditional choice mod-
els. This family of statistical estimators models the choice situation of elites in one country at a
given point in time by comparing all potential government coalitions rather than only the observed
outcome. Conditional logit models thus combine the rigour of fixed effects estimators with the
ability to capture the exact bargaining situation of each state. Rather than estimating the binary
decision of coalition government versus monoethnic rule (Reilly, 2005) or the share of the in-
cluded population (Wimmer, 2013, Ch.5), the estimator enables me to capture the different choice
environments in ethnic majority countries such as Turkey and fragmented polities such as Chad.
My unit of analysis is the formation opportunity that includes between three and over a million
government choices depending on the number of groups in a state.13 Conditional choice models
estimate the likelihood of each alternative available to leaders at each formation opportunity. Al-
though the number of choices varies, these models weigh each formation opportunity equally. A
large number of choices in one state does not disproportionally influence the estimated coefficients
relative to a formation opportunity in a different state with fewer choices since each formation
opportunity only counts as one unit. Similarly, the estimator accounts for a changing number of
relevant groups within states over time.
I draw my sample of formation opportunities from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset
(Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013), which codes po-
tion imply higher trust/policy agreement relative to more diverse coalitions.
13See Table A2 for an example. The number of coalition choices at a formation opportunity is
2n − 1, where n is the number of groups, as the empty coalition is excluded. Since the number of
choices rises exponentially, a state like India with 20 relevant groups presents more than a million
coalition opportunities compared with 3 in Trinidad and Tobago.
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litically relevant ethnic groups in all states where leaders make claims on behalf of their groups,
or where the state discriminates politically against any group.14 Government coalitions are usually
formed between political organizations that represent ethnic groups and EPR implicitly includes
organizations. The EPR codebook notes that “[an] ethnic group is considered politically relevant
if at least one political organization claims to represent it in national politics. . . ” (Min, Cederman
and Wimmer, 2008). While it would be preferable to have data on political organizations, existing
datasets usually only include a much smaller number of groups or states. Moreover, some regimes
included in this study legally ban all political organizations. For most military dictatorships, it
would be impossible to collect organizational actor information.
I construct my dependent variable, the actual government choice, from information on the
political access of group representatives to executive power. When EPR considers group represen-
tatives as included in the executive, I code the group as a participant in the actual government.15
Token membership by ethnic elites that do not effectively represent a group does not qualify for
an “inclusion” coding. Only if elites from at least two groups effectively represent their respective
coethnics, does my data record power-sharing.
Drawing on its constructivist understanding of ethnicity, EPR traces the reconfiguration of
ethnic group boundaries. In a number of states, ethnic groups split into smaller segments – Blacks
in South Africa after the end of Apartheid – or merge into larger ones, for example, along territorial
lines.16 Ethnic groups gain or lose political relevance in national politics when elites start or cease
to make claims on behalf of these groups. Similarly, the data capture changes in relative group
sizes over time, for example, due to differential birth rates in Lebanon.
New formation opportunities arise under two sets of circumstances. First, the actual bargaining
environment must change. This occurs whenever the EPR dataset records changes in group size,
in the set of politically relevant ethnic groups, or in the power position of any group that does not
affect coalition composition.17 These events are comparable to new elections in the literature on
14Discrimination is usually negative as in Apartheid-South Africa.
15Monoethnic regimes consist of “dominant” or “monopoly” groups. Coalition governments
feature “senior” and “junior partners” (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010, 93 & 100-1).
16Horowitz (2002, 20) describes the ethnic polarization of political allegiances between northern
and southern groups in many African states.
17This might include a relative change within the government coalition, one group moves from
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parliamentary government formation. Second, novel formation opportunities also arise when the
government composition changes without any apparent alteration to the overall bargaining envi-
ronment. Such reconfigurations result either from government breakdown, in which case at least
one group leaves the government, or from government expansion, when at least one group enters
the coalition. This situation is comparable to government collapse after a vote of no confidence in
the study of parliamentary government formation. I use these changes in the ethnic composition
of the executive to measure the time in years until government failure in the duration analysis.
The data then include a new formation opportunity that comprises all possible combinations
of ethnic groups, and identify the realized government.18 Although governments constantly face
the possibility of failure, and thus reconfiguration, the distribution of realized governments at the
formation opportunities identified above does not differ much from the distribution of formation
opportunities recorded each year (see Figure A3). However, my approach is computationally
more feasible. Due to such limitations, my analysis already excludes Russia/the Soviet Union
and China.19 Yet my sample still features 4,795,033 potential coalitions across 473 formation
opportunities in 134 ethnically divided states between 1946 and 2009.
My explanatory variables proxy power relations through the number of groups in a potential
coalition, and four dummy variables that note whether the largest group in a state is included,
whether elites form single-group majority governments, oversized or minimum-winning coali-
tions.20 I follow common practise and use the population share of ethnic groups to code their
relative power in the coalition (e.g., Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015, 467). Theories of coalition
formation generally attribute a formateur advantage to the largest ethnic group in a state, which
is thus an important control variable (ibid.). Moreover, Riker’s (1967) “size principle” suggests
that elites prefer ruling with as few other groups as possible to maximize their own share of power
junior to senior partner status, or among excluded groups, when a previously discriminated group
moves to powerless status.
18The online appendix provides an alternative strategy to identify formation opportunities based
on changes in the institutional setup and leadership alternations that likely indicate a change in the
bargaining environment. Analyses based on this sample do not alter the fundamental conclusions.
19The exponential growth in the number of combinations in countries with more than 40 groups
translates into more than a trillion potential coalitions at each formation opportunity.
20Minority coalitions constitute the residual category.
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and spoils. Finally, I control for path dependencies by adding a variable that measures the share of
the population represented in the previous government, which drops initial formation opportunities
and reduces the sample to 333 cases.
In order to measure cleavages for each potential government constellation, I collected new
data on the linguistic, religious, and racial segments of each ethnic group in the EPR data.21 As
suggested by constructivist theories of ethnicity, individuals usually possess multiple identity at-
tributes but not all of them are politically salient at the same time (Chandra, 2012). The politically
relevant groups included in the EPR data usually differ from other groups on at least one but not
necessarily on all ethnic dimensions. Using two ethnic groups from Nigeria as examples, Figure 2
shows that the data provide information on up to three segments per ethnic dimension. The Yoruba
and Hausa-Fulani are primarily divided by language but members of both groups adhere to the
Sunni Muslim faith, and they do not differ on the racial dimension.
Figure 2: Example of linguistic, religious, and racial subgroup segments for the Hausa-Fulani and
Yoruba in Nigeria.
To assess the potential for members of one group to defect to elites who stress alternative
identity attributes, I count the ethnic dimensions with at least one division between groups. In a
potential coalition between the Haussa and Yoruba in Nigera, the variable would take the value
‘2’, reflecting racial homogeneity but differences on the language and religious dimensions. The
coalition is thus vulnerable to splits on the two latter ethnic dimensions, for example, if Christian
Yoruba would align with other southern Christians or other Yoruba-speakers and exclude Hausa-
Fulani and Yoruba Muslims. I also use another operationalization that counts the sum of all cleav-
21I derived most of the information from the Ethnologue catalog of languages by Lewis (2009)
and the Joshua Project: Unreached Peoples of the World (2011) online database that codes the
religious affiliation of Ethnologue groups. See the online appendix for more details.
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ages by coalition. In the Hausa-Fulani and Yoruba case, the total cleavage count takes a value of
‘5’, reflecting three linguistic cleavages and two religious divisions. The shared Sunni segment
reduces the number of cleavages on the religious dimension relative to a similar coalition part-
ner with a non-Sunni religious segment. Whereas the cleavage dimension variable provides the
more conservative measure as it disregards shared sub-segments, the total cleavage count more
accurately traces potential splits within groups.22
The duration sample only includes realized governments for each year in which the government
holds office for a total of 6,390 government-years and 179 instances of changes in its ethnic com-
position. The analysis uses all explanatory variables from the formation stage except for lagged
government membership. In addition, I control for rebellions targeted at overthrowing the gov-
ernment (Gleditsch et al., 2002), coups and leader age (Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza, 2009),
as well as GDP and population variables (Gleditsch, 2002) that correlate strongly with instability
(Hegre and Sambanis, 2006).23 I employ Cox-proportional hazard models to estimate the impact
of explanatory factors on the baseline hazard of coalition failure (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones,
2004).24
Analysis
Before turning to multivariate choice models of coalition formation and duration, I explore the
global patterns of ethnic coalitions descriptively. Between 1946 and 2009, ethnic leaders formed
coalitions in more than half of all formation opportunities (246). Among coalition governments,
elites opted for Lijphart’s grand coalition that contains representatives of all relevant ethnic groups
76 times. The Central African Republic features the smallest ethnic coalition between the Yakoma
and Mbaka with just 9% of the country’s population.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of realized government types in ethnically divided societies
and the population shares represented in them (bottom). The pattern revealed by the bar graph is
definite: the vast majority of ethnic governments are majority governments, and the combination
of grand and oversized coalitions constitute the modal government type. Focusing on non-western
states (grey area) further strengthens the conclusion that leaders prefer oversized coalitions over
22Figure A6 plots the distribution of the two variables.
23Table A8 in the appendix provides summary statistics.
24Cox models estimate the form of the hazard rate from the data.
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Figure 3: Realized governments and size of included population in 134 states, 1946–2009.
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other government types and half of these coalitions even include a majority group. As the size
distribution of single-member majority regimes below shows, elites generally choose monoethnic
rule when they command an overwhelming demographic majority (the average is about 84% while
the median is even higher). Only 14% of all monoethnic majority governments represent less than
60% of the population.
In states with a secure monoethnic majority, neither violent challenges by exluded minorities
nor internal defections by coethnics present a credible threat to the dominant group. Single-group
majorities prove more stable with an average duration of more than 30 years compared to oversized
coalitions with an average duration of about 15 years. Oversized coalitions account for 104 out of
161 changes in government composition (64%), and for 93% of all events in which the leaders of
at least one group have to leave the government. This empirical pattern is consistent with both my
uncertainty logic that sees oversized coalitions as insurance against defections, and theories that
link commitment problems to instability (e.g., Roessler, 2011). Whereas the commitment prob-
lem explains the frequency and stability of monoethnic majorities, it cannot explain why unstable
oversized coalitions are replaced by other oversized pacts rather than single-group rule.
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Coalition formation
Table 1 presents five conditional logit models that test H1 and H2. As indicated by the positive
effects for single-group majorities and oversized coalitions across all models, governments that
include groups representing more than 50% of the ethnically relevant population in a state are more
likely to emerge than minority governments (the baseline category). Political elites that represent
majority ethnic groups often opt to govern alone as argued by Horowitz (2002, 22). Yet many of
these governments rule in European and American states, which represent successful nationalist
projects (Figure 3).
Contrary to predictions of many models of coalition formation, ethnic leaders rarely choose
minimum-winning coalitions. The estimated effect is statistically insignificant in all and even neg-
ative in the first three models in Table 1, implying that in some circumstances even minority rule
seems more likely. Where ethnic group elites do cooperate, they overwhelmingly form oversized
coalitions. Wald tests indicate that both oversized and single-majority governments differ signifi-
cantly from minimum-winning coalitions (χ2(1) = {5.11?, 4.88?}). Overall, these models provide
strong evidence in support of H1 that expects ethnic elites to form secure majorities.
Turning to the control variables, the estimate for the largest group dummy is positive but sta-
tistically insignificant in all models, which provides weak support for a formateur advantage. In
Model 1, the negative estimate for the number of groups in a coalition implies that ethnic elites
try to maximize their own relative share of power with respect to other ethnic groups, even while
they are building secure majorities. This negative effect also sheds doubt on Lijphart’s prediction
of grand coalitions.25
Model 2 adds a cleavage count variable to the base specification. As opposed to the estimated
effect of the number of included groups, which becomes indistinguishable from zero, the cleavage
effect is negative and statistically significant. Clearly, political elites prefer more homogeneous
governments to more diverse alternatives. The fewer cleavages included in the government relative
to alternative coalition options, the more difficult it becomes for exluded politicians to activate
other ethnic dimensions that cross-cut government-opposition lines. In line with H2, supporter
defections through cleavage reconfiguration become less likely.
25Figure A7 in the appendix also plots the predictions of grand coalitions from Model 1, which
clearly demonstrates that they are less likely than oversized coalitions.
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Table 1: Conditional logit models of coalition formation in 134 states, 1946–2009.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Single-Group Majority 2.724∗∗∗ 2.193∗∗∗ 2.181∗∗∗ 1.985∗∗∗ 2.976∗∗∗
(0.427) (0.420) (0.429) (0.511) (0.735)
Minimum-Winning -1.203 -0.582 -0.184 1.625
Coalition (1.059) (1.053) (1.071) (1.190)
Oversized Coalition 1.545∗∗∗ 1.977∗∗∗ 2.036∗∗∗ 2.116∗∗∗ 2.566∗∗∗
(0.407) (0.407) (0.411) (0.443) (0.630)
Largest Group 0.273 0.348 0.147 -0.065 0.607
(0.336) (0.337) (0.295) (0.353) (0.434)
Member Count -0.528∗ -0.348 -0.295 -0.515∗ 0.142
(0.218) (0.217) (0.224) (0.238) (0.262)
Cleavage Dimensions -0.973∗∗∗ -0.915∗∗∗ -0.688∗ -1.465∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.255) (0.271) (0.429)
Past Government 2.710∗∗∗ 2.422∗∗∗ 3.880∗∗∗
Share (0.458) (0.484) (1.064)
Formation Opportunities 473 473 333 208 125
Potential Coalitions 4795033 4795033 4489587 279316 4210271
` -1327.874 -1276.863 -940.774 -635.622 -288.601
χ2 95.953 118.332 107.631 67.568 79.583
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Model 3 adds a variable that measures the population share included in both the previous and
newly formed government. Its positive estimate indicates that incumbency exerts a strong influence
on the subsequent ethnic composition of governments. Including an incumbency proxy weakens
some of the other regressors – especially the largest group dummy – but does not change the
substantive insights regarding H1 and H2.
Alternative explanations of coalition formation
Formal rules that encourage or prescribe elite cooperation offer the most important alternative ex-
planation to my theory. To test this proposition I rerun Model 3 on a subset of different institutional
configurations. In Table 1, Models 4 and 5 display the estimated coefficients for autocracies and
democracies respectively.26 Lijphart and others expect that democracies and PR electoral rules
should make minority rule unlikely while increasing the probability of ethnic coalition formation
relative to single-group rule (Lijphart, 2002; Norris, 2008). Although Model 4 and 5 display some
differences such as the larger estimate for single-majority governments in democracies, none of
these changes differ significantly between the two subsets. The increased size of the estimated
coefficient likely derives from including established nation-states in Europe and the Americas.
Figure 4 reinforces this conclusion by displaying the predicted probabilities across all forma-
tion opportunities for various government types. For each type, the plot displays the probability
in democracies and dictatorships on the left (data from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010), and
in electoral systems within democracies on the right (data from Bormann and Golder, 2013). The
bars inside the boxes indicate the median predicted probability while the whiskers represent the
90% confidence intervals.
The left panel of Figure 4 shows hardly any differences between democracies (white boxes)
and dictatorships (black) in the overall patterns of government formation. Only minority rule by
one ethnic group is significantly more likely in dictatorships than in democracies. The graph also
confirms that ethnic elites are far more likely to form either single-group majorities or oversized
coalitions than any other type of government. Again, no notable differences between democratic
and autocratic rule exist within these categories. Although it seems as if oversized coalitions are
even more likely in dictatorships than in democracies, the relationship is not statistically signifi-
26Minimum-winning coalitions are dropped from Model 4 because none formed in authoritarian
regimes. Table A12 displays the underlying regression models for the electoral distinctions.
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Figure 4: Estimated government type probabilities in democracies and dictatorships (left) and
under PR and majoritarian electoral rules within democracies (right).
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cant. Whether or not governments are elected has little effect on their ethnic inclusiveness.27
Several scholars agree that first-past-the-post electoral rules reduce the chances of multiethnic
coalitions because even minority groups can gain a majority of parliamentary seats (Lijphart, 1977;
Horowitz, 2000). The more proportional the electoral result, the greater the incentives for ethnic
power-sharing. The right panel of Figure 4 compares majoritarian and PR electoral systems. It
lends little support to the assertion that PR (black boxes) promotes ethnic power-sharing. Rather,
majoritarian electoral systems (white) are more often associated with oversized coalitions. Even
more surprisingly, ethnic leaders opt for single-member majorities significantly more often than
for oversized coalitions under PR. Uncertainty about coethnic support again explains this finding.
In contrast to PR systems, small changes in the vote distribution can lead to large shifts in the seat
distribution under majoritarian rule and result in loss of power. Elites hedge against this possibility
by forming oversized coalitions that allow them to remain in office after losing some support.28
Rather than differences in type, variation in institutional capacity could affect both the choice
of government type and its diversity. I proxy the capacity of non-state organizations by the degree
of party institutionalization and present or past communist insurgencies. In both cases, oversized
coalitions become more likely as the government anticipates a greater threat from excluded groups
(cf. Slater, 2010). In contrast, governments challenged by strong non-state institutions are less
27Using the Polity IV by Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr (2011) instead of the DD measure and
adding anocracies as a third category does not change this insight (Figure A8).
28In Figures A9-A11 in the appendix, I also explore variation within autocracies, specifically
between civilian and military regimes, dictatorships with and without ruling parties or legislatures.
The main results remain robust.
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likely to form coalitions around cross-cutting cleavages, potentially because strong organizations
harden identities and prevent defections (Table A19). I proxy state capacity by two historical mea-
sures: low settler mortality and a long history of statehood. Governments with greater degrees
of statehood are more likely to form oversized coalitions but the relationship reverses for govern-
ments of states with low settler mortality, possibly because the data is only available for a restricted
sample. Governments in weaker states pay more attention to internalizing cross-cutting cleavages
regardless of the measure as they have less power to guard themselves against supporter defec-
tion (Table A20). Overall, I find some evidence that institutional capacity affects the two main
theoretical mechanisms but the differences are not statistically significant.
Trust between groups that share ethnic attributes rather than the anticipation of defections offers
an alternative explanation for H2, which states that coalitions including cross-cutting cleavages
should be more likely. In the absence of survey data that allows me to test this mechanism directly
by comparing levels of trust between all ethnic groups within countries, I rely on existing research
and my qualitative narratives. Both indicate that it is unlikely that trust accounts for coalitions in
multiethnic societies. Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman (2016), for example, employ an
instrumental variable strategy to demonstrate that government leaders from one ethnic group tend
to include groups that pose a threat to their rule to appease them (also see Roessler, 2016, Ch.10).
Trust between the biggest rivals seems an unlikely explanation for the choice of such coalition
partners although more tests are needed to fully rule out this possibility.
To test the robustness of my results to modeling and sampling assumptions, I rerun the main
specifications with the more complex but unbiased mixed logit (Table A9) and on an alternative
specification of formation opportunities defined by institutional change (Table A10). In both cases,
my results remain robust. Selection poses another threat to the robustness of my results, although,
I argue, an unlikely one. If the two different sets of formation opportunities oversampled uncer-
tain periods and countries relative to stable situations, the results would be biased towards more
oversized and more homogeneous coalitions. Yet the sample of formation opportunities used above
balances actual changes in government composition (54%) with changes in the bargaining environ-
ment without governmental alternation (46%; see Table A5). Moreover, formation opportunities
are not more likely after coups or governmental civil wars (Table A6).
To ensure that the results are not driven by cases in which ethnicity has arguably less political
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salience, I rerun Model 3 on various subsets of countries. Neither the removal of specific world
regions (Table A11), nor the exclusion of states where the largest ethnic group accounts for at most
60% of the population challenges my findings. Adopting a broader definition of minimum-winning
coalitions has no effects on the main insights of the formation analysis either (Table A12). I
continue to find support forH2 when replacing the cleavage dimension variable with the total count
of cleavages. Other tests show no systematic relationship between any specific ethnic dimension
and coalition formation predicted by cultural distance theories (Table A13).
Coalition duration
My theory predicts that elites form oversized coalitions around cross-cutting cleavages to minimize
the risk of supporter defection. Empirically, governments that internalize cross-cutting cleavages
should survive longer than more heterogeneous pacts with more overlap with excluded groups
(H3). Moreover, oversized coalitions should be less stable than monoethnic governments because
elites form them in anticipation of defections. The Cox regression models in Table 2 estimate these
effects on the risk of changes in the ethnic composition of the government. Positive coefficients
indicate an increased risk of government failure.29
Across all specifications, governments that feature more cleavage dimensions are more likely
to fail than governments formed around fewer cleavage types while controlling for the number of
groups in the coalition. When coalitions include cross-cutting cleavages, and thus fewer overall
cleavage dimensions, the likelihood of supporter realignment that changes the ethnic composition
of the government decreases as predicted by H3. In line with the uncertainty logic, Wald tests indi-
cate that monoethnic governments with a crushing demographic dominance and little opportunity
for defection outlast oversized coalitions in all models. Relative to the baseline category of minor-
ity governments single-group majorities are associated with a lower risk of failing, although the
difference is only significant at the 10% level once I add controls for regime capacity. Similarly,
oversized coalitions do not seem to outlast minority governments. However, they grow more stable
as leaders add additional ethnic groups to the coalition. Whether or not a coalition includes the
country’s largest group does not make a statistically significant difference to government stability.
29The duration models estimate the likelihood of failure of realized governments. With only one
minimum-winning coalition among them, which lasted for three years, I dropped the dummy from
the duration analysis.
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Table 2: Cox duration models of coalition failure, 1946-2009.
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Single-Group Majority −1.320∗∗∗ −1.061∗ −0.960 −1.101 −1.021
(0.387) (0.507) (0.538) (0.606) (0.589)
Oversized Coalition −0.208 0.174 0.291 0.258 0.240
(0.323) (0.423) (0.453) (0.502) (0.501)
Largest Group −0.182 −0.331 −0.330 −0.327 −0.304
(0.339) (0.459) (0.485) (0.568) (0.547)
Member Count −0.099∗ −0.116∗ −0.105 −0.116 −0.117∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.062) (0.061) (0.057)
Cleavage Dimensions 0.711∗∗ 0.765∗∗ 0.660∗ 0.531∗ 0.616∗
(0.231) (0.246) (0.267) (0.245) (0.253)
Civil War Ongoing 0.495∗∗ 0.354∗ 0.366∗ 0.365∗
(0.155) (0.156) (0.168) (0.160)
Irr. Leader Change 1.977∗∗∗ 1.962∗∗∗ 2.002∗∗∗ 1.970∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.211) (0.198) (0.202)
Log(Leader Tenure) 0.286∗∗ 0.218∗ 0.348∗∗ 0.233∗
(0.094) (0.089) (0.112) (0.099)
Socio-Economic Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
DD Regime Institutions No No No Yes No
Electoral & Party Institutions No No No No Yes
Wald test: Pr(β1 = β2) <0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
Observations 6,360 5,724 5,724 5,724 5,724
` −859.352 −680.765 −674.130 −663.093 −669.222
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. Displayed estimates are coefficients, not hazard ratios. Country-
clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Model 7 controls for important threats to incumbent governments: ongoing governmental civil
wars, coups, and the age of the current head of government all increase the risk of changes to
the ruling coalition. Governments are more stable in wealthier countries while GDP growth and
population size are statistically insignificant (see Table A21 for full results). Model 9 includes
regime type dummies from the Democracy and Dictatorship dataset. Monarchies produce more
stable ethnic power relations but other regime types differ little from one another. Finally, Model 10
introduces electoral and party-system dummies that link majoritarian electoral rules with higher
government instability in line with my uncertainty-based theory.30
Alternative explanations of coalition duration
As in the formation stage, the most important alternative explanation of coalition stability is an
institutional one, specifically in dictatorships where legislatures and parties correlate strongly with
regime stability. Yet controlling for an alternative set of authoritarian and democratic institutions
30Tests of the proportional hazards assumption do not reveal any violations.
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does not change the robustness of the estimated effects (Table A22). Adding controls for institu-
tional strength reduces the statistical significance of the estimated cleavage effect in some spec-
ifications while also decreasing sample size due to missing values on the institutional variables
(Table A23). Neither controlling for regime change periods and foreign occupation (Table A24)
nor using continuous indicators of the included population and groups rather than governmental
dummies alters the basic conclusions (Tables A25-A28).
Reverse causality and selection pose two challenges to my tests of H3. Although, a reverse
causal arrow running from coalition failure to more diverse and larger coalitions seems implau-
sible, I lagged all explanatory variables by one year. Selection is at the core of my theoretical
argument: leaders prefer coalition partners with cross-cutting cleavages and, if possible, select
into less diverse governments because they expect them to last longer. Both the formation and
duration stage support this interpretation with their estimated cleavage effects.
Illustrating case narrative
Before concluding, I illustrate the logic of my argument by briefly describing the dynamics of
ruling coalitions in Indonesia.31 The case exemplifies ethnically diverse polities with multiple
cleavage dimensions and showcases their effect on government formation and duration. I compare
two regime periods in Indonesian history. General Suharto’s authoritarian rule demonstrates scope
conditions of my argument in the form of non-ethnic institutions and overwhelming coercive ca-
pacity. The transition period after Suharto’s removal and the following democratic regime show
that elites form oversized coalitions out of uncertainty over future threats, and that internalizing
cross-cutting cleavages limits supporter defection.
After independence, attempts by Indonesia’s first President Sukarno to create a stable multieth-
nic regime by appealing to Indonesian nationalism, Islam, and the multiethnic Communist Party of
Indonesia (PKI) failed. Afraid of the PKI’s plans for land redistribution and its growing influence
among multiple ethnic groups, the Indonesian military led by General Suharto allied with religious
elites from Indonesia’s largest ethnic group, the Javanese, to overthrow Sukarno and kill hundreds
of thousands of PKI members (Roosa, 2006, 20-33). Instead of cross-cutting ethnic cleavages
highlighted by my argument, communist ideology buttressed by a strong non-state institution, the
PKI, bridged ethnic boundaries. Although the mechanism seems similar to my argument, future re-
31The appendix provides a more detailed narrative and adds Malaysia as a second case.
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search should follow Slater’s (2010) example and explore the interaction of ethnic and non-ethnic
cleavages and institutions.
After the politicide Suharto’s Javanese-dominated and “seemingly omnipotent state loomed
above a weakened and mostly quiescent society” (Aspinall, 2005, 27-8). My theory suggests that
single-group rule should only be possible when elites can count on overwhelming popular support.
Yet military aid by the United States during the Cold War and the lack of any meaningful domestic
challenger that could exploit Indonesia’s cross-cutting Muslim cleavages had effectively created a
secure majority, which ruled for three decades.
Feeling secure from external challenges, Suharto felt no need for sharing power. The Javanese
religious elites that supported Suharto against the communists, started turning away from the
regime and began to organize outside state institutions. During the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998,
Suharto was forced out of office by an economically and ethnically diverse opposition (Aspinall,
2005, 23-5; Slater, 2010, 180-1; Horowitz, 2013, 37). Faced by massive uncertainty, mistrust
among key players, and the threat of violence engulfing the country, a multiethnic, oversized coali-
tion formed during the transition period and continued to operate after the country’s transition to
democracy (Horowitz, 2013, 45-8).
This change from monoethnic rule to oversized coalitions illustrates the importance of cross-
cutting cleavages. Relying almost exclusively on Javanese-dominated military power, Suharto lost
the support of crucial Islamic elites (Slater, 2010, 193-4), who mobilized cross-class opposition to
his rule among the Javanese and outer-island ethnic groups. Excluding the cross-cutting Muslim
cleavage from the ruling coalition facilitated its demise.
The logic of cross-cutting cleavages shaped political competition even more after Suharto’s
ouster. Political elites could count on a core of supporters bound to them via shared identity
(Horowitz, 2013, 178), but failed to cement their hold on power due to the “very multiplicity [of
cleavages], so that not all of them were politically active at any one time, and their considerable
fluidity, so that alignments among various membership categories could shift” (ibid., 37). Thus:
Voter allegiances and party boundaries are both malleable. At both regional and na-
tional levels, candidates can and do defect from their parties to join executive tickets
nominated by other parties, even parties from a different stream [or cultural commu-
nity]. Candidate fluidity across streams, of course, induces voters who favor particular
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candidates to follow (ibid., 273).
To gain and keep presidential office, ruling elites formed multiethnic oversized coalitions that
combined modernist, traditional, and secular members from the dominant Javanese group along
with peripheral, generally Muslim, elites. In line with H3, the post-Suharto ruling coalition was
repeatedly returned to power despite high voter volatility. Although electoral support was also lost
to newly founded intra-ethnic rivals, the relevant power shifts occurred within the coalition. The
presidency alternated between members from different parties, but the ethnic composition of the
ruling coalition remained remarkably stable (Slater and Simmons, 2012, 1383-4).
When intra-coalition conflict over policy intensified in 2011, some coalition partners suggested
expelling disloyal members but President Yudhoyono preferred secure majorities that could sur-
vive future defections (Horowitz, 2013, 289). Cross-cutting cleavages within the coalition did not
translate into greater trust among ruling elites. Competition over the spoils of office and the desire
to keep them created the basis for oversized but not grand coalitions as predominantly Christian
ethnic groups and some intra-ethnic rivals from different parties remained excluded.
Conclusion
In this paper, I argued that multiethnic executive coalitions frequently result from elite uncertainty
about future support by their coethnics supporters and coalition partners. My findings indicate a
preference for oversized coalitions that stems from the desire of elites to hold on to power in envi-
ronments of incomplete information about coethnic support when cross-cutting cleavages enable
membership in multiple sub-groups. Alhough my analysis reveals that leaders seek ethnic hege-
mony when they command large demographic or coercive superiority, it also demonstrates that
power-sharing occurs more frequently than many existing studies predict (e.g., Horowitz, 2000).
Yet leaders do not predominantly form Lijphart’s grand coalitions either, as they balance the risks
of losing office and the costs of sharing power.
My argument also predicts which specific coalition leaders will choose. My results support and
complement insights from the literature on ethnic politics that show how rational individuals stress
the identity marker that allows them to be a member of the smallest possible winning coalition
(Posner, 2005; van der Veen and Laitin, 2012). Focusing on political elites, I argue that leaders an-
ticipate potential defections by their coethnics. Therefore, they attempt to form coalitions between
groups with cross-cutting cleavages that keep supporter defections inside the ruling coalition. In-
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deed, I find that elites prefer coalitions that encompass a smaller number of ethnic dimensions, and
thus incorporate more cross-cutting cleavages, to coalitions with more heterogeneous constituents
and more overlap with excluded groups. I also find that the former survive longer than the latter.
My explanation that combines the role of elites and their supporters adds to recent studies that
emphasize self-enforcing power-sharing coalitions (Svolik, 2009, Roessler, 2016, Ch.10), even
when formal institutions designed to enforce commitments are absent. I do not find that specific
institutions systematically increase the likelihood of ethnic coalition formation and only weak
evidence that these institutions extend the survival of ethnic coalitions. These findings have two
major implications for the literature on power-sharing and conflict research. First, future research
that investigates institutional interventions to resolve conflict needs to take the cleavage landscape
of societies and the resulting elite behavior into account. As Diermeier and Krehbiel (2003, 127)
point out: “It cannot be stressed enough that (. . . ) behavior within the institution – not just the
institution in isolation – determines whether institutions are outcome-consequential, or, as is more
often uttered, whether institutions matter.”
Second, if my theory is correct that encompassing coalitions emerge when leaders face uncer-
tainty, institutions that reduce uncertainty such as guaranteed government inclusion are less likely
to induce de facto cooperation among ethnic leaders. Since existing research also argues that high
uncertainty increases the risk of civil war (e.g., Mattes and Savun, 2010), we should expect that
elites embrace power-sharing when conflict is most likely. Policy-makers who want to promote
power-sharing for normative reasons of political equality thus face a dilemma. Future research
needs to pay more attention to the conditions under which ethnic coalitions form and how the
interaction of coalitions and institutions affect civil war risk.
Finally, focusing on ethnic coalitions allows political scientists interested in coalition behavior
more generally to expand their empirical scope far beyond parliamentary democracies in Europe
(e.g., Martin and Stevenson, 2001). Multiple theoretical models of coalition formation outside
parliamentary democracies now exist (e.g., Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin, 2008; Christia, 2012;
Driscoll, 2012; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015). Yet only few of these theories have been
exposed to the same systematic tests applied to parliamentary government formation. Ethnic divi-
sions constitute of course only one type of political cleavage, and many scholars hold that they are
exceptional (Lijphart, 1977, 238; Horowitz, 2000). Future research should focus on more complex
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cleavage configurations that include economic, ideological, and intra-religious divisions and fur-
ther cross-cut ethnic differences (also see Lupu and Riedl, 2012, fn.1). Only the comparative study
of cleavages will allow political scientists to conclude whether or not the patterns described in this
study are exceptional for ethnically divided societies, or generally prevalent in settings where elites
face high uncertainty about their true support.
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1 Predictions on coalition formation in the literature
Table A1: Predictions of coalition size in non-democratic states.
Scope Publication Prediction
Ethnically
Divided
Societies
Lijphart (1977, 238) (1) Grand coalitions under consociational ar-
rangements; (2) monoethnic dominance un-
der Westminster rules or in dictatorships
Horowitz (1993, 21) Monoethnic minority rule
Wimmer (1997, 649) Monoethnic minority rule
Horowitz (2000, 369 &
438)
Coalition government with electoral thresh-
olds, otherwise minority rule
Horowitz (2002, 20) Majority groups will dominate minorities
Rabushka and Shepsle
(2008, 91)
Grand coalitions formed prior to indepen-
dence break down into monoethnic rule
Sub-
Saharan
Africa
Arriola (2009) Leaders form oversized or grand coalitions to
endure in office
Roessler (2011) Leaders initially include coalition partners
but exclude them over time
Francois, Rainer and
Trebbi (2015)
Grand coalitions form
Post-
conflict
states
Dal Bó and Powell
(2009)
Coalition of unknown size only feasible when
coalition partner non-threatening
Mattes and Savun
(2009)
Coalition of unknown size through fear-
reducing and cost-increasing provisions in ne-
gotiated settlements
Driscoll (2012) Grand coalition that crumbles over time
Dictator-
ships
Bueno de Mesquita
et al. (2003, 70)
Minority coalitions large enough to with-
stand revolutions
Gandhi and Prze-
worski (2006, 2007)
Coalitions (of unknown size) induced by au-
thoritarian institutions such as parties and
legislatures
Acemoglu, Egorov
and Sonin (2008)
Coalition size depends on power configura-
tion between elites
Boix and Svolik (2013,
307)
Minimum-winning coalitions induced by au-
thoritarian institutions such as legislatures
and parties
2 Definitions of formation opportunities
Table A2 displays an example of a formation opportunity in Iraq in 2003.
The analyses in this paper are run on a sample of formation opportunities defined by
changes in the size, unity, or number of ethnic groups, and changes in the power relations
between these groups within a country. An alternative strategy to identify formation op-
portunities is to link them to major institutional changes. In addition to the first year of a
A2
Table A2: Ethnic coalition formation opportunities in Iraq.
Formation
Opportunity
Coalition Member(s) Pop.
Share
Actual
Coalition
(1) Sunni 0.19 0
(2) Shi’a 0.63 0
(3) Kurds 0.17 0
(4) Sunni & Shi’a 0.82 0
(5) Sunni & Kurds 0.36 0
(6) Shi’a and Kurds 0.8 1
(7) Sunni, Shi’a & Kurds 1 0
state’s existence, this alternative definition identifies electoral rule changes in democracies,
leadership changes in autocracies, and regime transitions between democratic and auto-
cratic regimes as relevant windows of opportunity in which elites attempt to renegotiate
ethnic power relations. I identify different regimes and transitions between them in the
Democracy and Dictatorship dataset by (Przeworski et al., 2000; Cheibub, Gandhi and
Vreeland, 2010) The data is particularly useful for the purpose of this analysis because
it offers a dichotomous distinction between democracy and dictatorship that relies on a
mixture of institutional rules and personal leadership – the two criteria used to identify
formation opportunities. It only identifies a democratic regime when there have been
elections for the legislature and the executive in which at least two parties compete, and
if the government has changed at least once (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland, 2010, 69).
Within democratic regimes, I follow the established approach in the comparative litera-
ture to code the timing of electoral regime changes (Lijphart, 1994, 14).1 In dictatorships,
leadership changes indicate regime alternations (Geddes, 2003; Svolik, 2009). I rely on the
Archigos dataset by Goemans, Gleditsch and Chiozza (2009). Overall, this alternative
sample includes 803 distinct formation opportunities, and thus almost twice as many as
the one used in the main analysis. Table A3 and Figure A3 provide more information on
the two alternative sampling strategies.
3 Coding ethnic segments, dimensions, and cleavages
The cleavage data capture three ethnic dimensions : linguistic, religious, and racial differ-
ences. I refer to all individuals who share an ethnic attribute or marker, for example all
Urdu speakers in India, as one ethnic segment. Ethnic segments and groups are not iden-
tical. Segments derive purely from shared individual attributes/markers; groups emerge
from the political mobilization of group members based on one or more shared attributes
(cf. Chandra, 2012, 58). Segments can be shared between groups and thus constitute
1Also see Golder (2005, 107). The data are from Bormann and Golder (2013).
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cross-cutting cleavages, or they stack up to define group boundaries as reinforcing cleav-
ages.
I compute cleavages from newly collected data on ethnic segments, which feature two
innovations: first, they include religious, linguistic, and racial segments for each group
rather than defining groups as either linguistic, religious, or racial a priori. I define race as
ethnic groups’ origins from particular world regions, such as Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa,
Oceania, etc. These regional origins – expressed at the individual level through certain
phenotypical markers (particularly skin color) – have become relevant as social categories
in the context of European colonization of the world and the related process of racial
classification (see, e.g., Wade, 2010, 5-19). Second, the data identify multiple linguistic
and religious segments per group rather than identifying only one.
Figure 2 illustrates the coding with regards to two Nigerian groups. While belonging to
one religion, the Hausa-Fulani are divided linguistically into three segments. Conversely, a
linguistically homogeneous group such as the Yoruba may count adherents from multiple
religions such as Islam and Christianity among its members. Per group I identify up to
three linguistic, religious, and racial segments along with their relative demographic share
of all group members. The Yoruba’s largest religious segment includes 43% of all group
members.
In principle, a politically relevant ethnic group in EPR could consist of more than
three segments on one ethnic dimension but in the vast majority of cases they do not. In
exceptional cases such as the Indigenous Peoples in Brazil, I only coded the three largest
segments. Note that a segment was only recorded if it accounted for at least 10% of group
members.
The data on linguistic segments build on the well-known Ethnologue database, which
uses mutual intelligibility as its main criterion for identifying languages (Lewis, 2009).
Data on religious segments derive from the Joshua Project, which connects the language
groups of Ethnologue with government statistics, and a variety of sources on religious
adherence, yielding a list of “people’s groups and their religious make-up” (see Joshua
Project: Unreached Peoples of the World, 2011).
The dataset codes ethnic segments as time-invariant properties that do not capture
multilingual or syncretic practices primarily due to limited data availability. Time invari-
ance is a reasonable assumption because cultural change is usually a multi-generational
process (see, e.g., Weber, 1976). Although multilingualism and syncretism are possible
on the individual level, they rather reinforce my argument. Where individuals can claim
belonging to multiple identity categories, coalition formation will be more uncertain and
thus oversized coalitions should be more likely. Laitin (1993) proposes a similar argument
with respect to language regimes.
In sum, my dataset contains 629 unique languages and 67 distinct religious creeds,
and 7 distinct racial segments for 793 ethnic groups. These sum to 1,147 linguistic, 1,535
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religious, and 920 racial group-segments. As a result, ethnic groups are more uniform
in linguistic terms than along the religious dimension but most uniform on the racial
dimension. The mean of linguistic segments per ethnic group is approximately 1.4, just
over 1.9 for religious segments, and about 1.1 for racial divisions.
4 Methods: the mixed logit
The mixed logit model has two advantages over the conditional logit. First, it relaxes
the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption that can produce bias in the
estimated coefficients of the conditional logit.2 Second, it allows me to model random
coefficients that account for unobserved preference heterogeneity among ethnic elites.
While I assume that all ethnic elites are power-maximizing actors, it is not inconceivable
that the preferences of political leaders regarding the size and make-up of their ruling
coalition are not constant. For example, in the neighboring countries of South Africa
and Zimbabwe, political history with respect to inter-ethnic relationships developed very
differently over the past three decades. Some observers attribute inter-ethnic peace in
South Africa to the conciliatory character of Nelson Mandela, and inter-ethnic conflict
in Zimbabwe to Robert Mugabe’s intransigence and thirst for power.3 Besides being a
more realistic modeling strategy, the random coefficients also provide more information.
In addition to average effects the mixed logit model estimates a full distribution around
the mean effect for each explanatory variable (see Figure A1).
However, the mixed logit also has at least one drawback: Its estimation is computa-
tionally very demanding. Model runs may take several hours or even days. The reason for
this sluggishness is that the likelihood is not analytically tractable. Instead of maximum
likelihood estimation, the mixed logit requires simulation techniques such as Maximum
Simulated Likelihood (MSL) or Bayesian Monte Carlo simulation.4 I use Maximum Simu-
lated Likelihood estimation with 500 Halton draws and a burn-in period of 50 draws.5 The
mixed logit models in this appendix do not include Indian formation opportunities, whose
choice alternatives exceed the computational capability of my computer (see Table A3).
More formally, the mixed logit models the probability of government j out ofK choices
in formation opportunity i:
Pr
ij
=
exijβ+xijηi∑K
k=1 e
xijβ+xijηi
As the random effects – that is, the ηs – are not directly observed, a joint probability
distribution g(η|Ω) is used where Ω includes the fixed parameters of the distribution g.
To obtain the unconditional probability of a coalition choice, the previous expression is
2Glasgow, Golder and Golder (2012, 251-3).
3Chideya (2013); Smith (2014).
4Train (2003, Chs.10-12).
5Cf. Glasgow, Golder and Golder (2012, 254).
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Figure A1: Example of estimated parameters in mixed logit models.
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integrated over all possible values of η and weighted by the probability density function
g:
Pr
ij
=
∫ [
exijβ+xijηi∑K
k=1 e
xijβ+xijηi
]
g(η|Ω)dη
The researcher must make assumptions about g but it is common to use the normal
distribution, and I do so in my analyses.6
6Glasgow, Golder and Golder (2012, 255).
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5 Descriptive statistics
Due to computational limitations, three states are not included in all analyses. China
and Russia/the Soviet Union are missing in all empirical tests, as each country features
more than 40 ethnic groups. Combining these groups at different formation opportunities
results in more than 10e14 government alternatives at any formation opportunity – a figure
that exceeds the storage space limits of a regular hard drive. Since both states have been
dominated by ethnic Chinese and Russians throughout the temporal span covered by my
analysis, adding these data points is unlikely to add much variance to models of coalition
formation. In contrast, India is included in the dataset. It is excluded from mixed-logit
estimates that are based on a simulation-based estimation strategy due to the too-large
number of government alternatives (see Table A3).
Table A3: Formation opportunities in the institution- and EPR-periods-based samples.
EPR Periods Institutional Change
− India + India − India + India
Number of states 133 134 133 134
Formation opportunities 467 473 800 803
Potential governments 338,591 4,795,035 338,882 1,125,311
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Table A4: All formation opportunities that experience change (EPR sample).
Country Year Type Failure Coup Rebellion
United States 2009 Oversized Coalition expansion 0
Trinidad and Tobago 1987 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 1992 Minority Single breakup 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago 1996 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Guyana 1992 Majority Single replacement 0 0
Brazil 2003 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Bolivia 2006 Oversized Coalition expansion 0
United Kingdom 1964 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Slovakia 1998 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Slovakia 2007 Majority Single breakup 0
Yugoslavia 1966 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Yugoslavia 1987 Oversized Coalition breakup 0 0
Yugoslavia 1992 Oversized Coalition breakup 0 0
Yugoslavia 2007 Majority Single breakup 0
Bosnia 1996 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Cyprus 1964 Majority Single breakup 0 0
Bulgaria 2002 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Moldova 2001 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Romania 1996 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Romania 2009 Majority Single breakup 0
Guinea-Bissau 1981 Grand Coalition replacement 1 0
Guinea-Bissau 2000 Majority Single breakup 1 0
Guinea-Bissau 2006 Grand Coalition expansion 0
Guinea-Bissau 2009 Majority Single breakup 0
Mali 1991 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Mali 1994 Majority Single breakup 0 0
Mali 1996 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Benin 1964 Oversized Coalition breakup 1 0
Benin 1968 Oversized Coalition exchange 1 0
Benin 1970 Grand Coalition expansion 1 0
Benin 1990 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Benin 1996 Oversized Coalition breakup 0 0
Benin 2006 Grand Coalition expansion 0
Mauritania 1984 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Niger 1991 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Niger 1993 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 1
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Niger 1996 Minority Single breakup 0 0
Niger 2000 Oversized Coalition expansion 1 0
Ivory Coast 1994 Minority Coalition breakup 0 0
Ivory Coast 2000 Oversized Coalition expansion 1 0
Ivory Coast 2003 Grand Coalition expansion 0 1
Guinea 1986 Minority Single breakup 0 0
Guinea 2009 Grand Coalition expansion 0
Liberia 1981 Minority Single replacement 1 1
Liberia 2004 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Sierra Leone 1964 Minority Single breakup 0 0
Sierra Leone 1968 Oversized Coalition replacement 1 0
Sierra Leone 2006 Grand Coalition expansion 0
Sierra Leone 2008 Grand Coalition exchange 0
Ghana 1966 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Ghana 1970 Oversized Coalition breakup 0 0
Ghana 1972 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Togo 1963 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Togo 1967 Minority Single breakup 0 0
Togo 1991 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Togo 1992 Minority Single breakup 0 0
Togo 2006 Grand Coalition expansion 0
Nigeria 1965 Minority Single breakup 0 0
Nigeria 1967 Oversized Coalition expansion 1 0
Nigeria 1970 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Nigeria 1979 Oversized Coalition breakup 0 0
Nigeria 1984 Minority Single breakup 1 0
Nigeria 1999 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Nigeria 2007 Oversized Coalition expansion 0
Gabon 1963 Minority Single breakup 0 0
Gabon 1968 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Gabon 2001 Oversized Coalition exchange 0 0
Gabon 2006 Grand Coalition exchange 0
CAR 1966 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
CAR 1970 Minority Single breakup 0 0
CAR 1982 Minority Coalition replacement 1 0
CAR 1994 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
CAR 2002 Oversized Coalition breakup 0 1
CAR 2003 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
CAR 2006 Oversized Coalition breakup 0
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CAR 2009 Grand Coalition expansion 0
Chad 1976 Oversized Coalition expansion 1 0
Chad 1983 Oversized Coalition exchange 1 0
Chad 1987 Oversized Coalition breakup 0 0
Chad 1989 Oversized Coalition breakup 0 0
Chad 1991 Oversized Coalition expansion 1 0
Chad 2006 Oversized Coalition breakup 0
Congo 1964 Minority Coalition exchange 1 0
Congo 1969 Oversized Coalition exchange 1 0
Congo 1972 Minority Single breakup 0 0
Congo 1977 Minority Coalition replacement 0 0
Congo 1979 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Congo 1985 Minority Coalition breakup 0 0
Congo 1991 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Congo 1992 Oversized Coalition breakup 0 0
Congo 1995 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Congo 1998 Minority Coalition exchange 1 0
DR Congo 1997 Minority Coalition replacement 0 1
DR Congo 1998 Minority Coalition exchange 1 1
DR Congo 2003 Minority Coalition expansion 0 0
DR Congo 2007 Minority Coalition breakup 1
Uganda 1966 Minority Single replacement 0 0
Uganda 1970 Minority Coalition replacement 0 0
Uganda 1972 Minority Single breakup 1 1
Uganda 1974 Minority Single replacement 0 0
Uganda 1980 Minority Single replacement 0 0
Uganda 1986 Oversized Coalition replacement 1 0
Uganda 1990 Oversized Coalition exchange 0 1
Kenya 1967 Oversized Coalition breakup 0 0
Kenya 1979 Oversized Coalition exchange 0 0
Kenya 2003 Oversized Coalition exchange 0 0
Kenya 2006 Oversized Coalition breakup 0
Kenya 2008 Grand Coalition expansion 0
Burundi 1966 Minority Single breakup 0 1
Burundi 1989 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Burundi 1994 Minority Single breakup 1 0
Burundi 2002 Grand Coalition expansion 0 1
Rwanda 1995 Minority Single replacement 1 1
Djibouti 1981 Majority Single breakup 0 0
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Djibouti 1992 Grand Coalition expansion 0 1
Djibouti 2003 Majority Single breakup 0 0
Ethiopia 1992 Oversized Coalition expansion 1 0
Eritrea 2000 Oversized Coalition exchange 0 1
Zimbabwe 1980 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Zimbabwe 1982 Oversized Coalition exchange 0 0
Zimbabwe 1988 Oversized Coalition exchange 0 0
Zimbabwe 1992 Grand Coalition exchange 0 0
Zimbabwe 2000 Majority Single breakup 0 0
Zimbabwe 2006 Oversized Coalition expansion 0
Malawi 1994 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
South Africa 1948 Minority Single replacement 0 0
South Africa 1994 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Madagascar 1973 Grand Coalition expansion 1 0
Sudan 2006 Minority Coalition expansion 1
Iran 1947 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Iraq 1964 Minority Single breakup 1 0
Iraq 2003 Oversized Coalition replacement 0 0
Syria 1949 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Syria 1958 Majority Single breakup 0 0
Syria 1961 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Syria 1970 Minority Single breakup 0 0
Lebanon 1971 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Israel 1977 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Israel 1992 Min-Winning Coalition expansion 0 0
Israel 1996 Oversized Coalition expansion 1 0
Yemen 1995 Grand Coalition exchange 0 0
Afghanistan 1979 Oversized Coalition expansion 1 0
Afghanistan 1992 Oversized Coalition exchange 0 1
Afghanistan 1996 Minority Single replacement 0 1
Afghanistan 2002 Oversized Coalition expansion 1 1
Kyrgyzstan 2005 Majority Single breakup 0 0
Kazakhstan 1995 Majority Single breakup 0 0
Taiwan 1987 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
India 1972 Oversized Coalition
India 1977 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Bhutan 1988 Minority Single replacement 0 0
Pakistan 1972 Oversized Coalition exchange 1 0
Pakistan 1974 Oversized Coalition breakup 0 0
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Pakistan 1978 Oversized Coalition exchange 1 0
Pakistan 1989 Oversized Coalition exchange 1 0
Pakistan 2000 Oversized Coalition exchange 1 0
Pakistan 2009 Oversized Coalition exchange 0
Myanmar 1959 Majority Single breakup 0 0
Sri Lanka 1985 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Sri Lanka 1988 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Sri Lanka 2006 Majority Single breakup 0
Nepal 1951 Oversized Coalition replacement 0 0
Nepal 1960 Minority Single breakup 0 0
Nepal 1990 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Nepal 2001 Minority Coalition expansion 0 1
Nepal 2007 Oversized Coalition expansion 1
Thailand 1972 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Thailand 1977 Majority Single breakup 1 0
Cambodia 1970 Oversized Coalition breakup 0 0
Cambodia 1975 Majority Single breakup 0 0
Cambodia 1979 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
Cambodia 1993 Oversized Coalition exchange 0 0
Laos 1975 Oversized Coalition exchange 0 0
Laos 1991 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 1
Indonesia 2005 Oversized Coalition expansion 0 0
New Zealand 1990 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Fiji 1988 Majority Single breakup 1 0
Fiji 2000 Grand Coalition expansion 0 0
Fiji 2001 Majority Single breakup 1 0
Fiji 2007 Grand Coalition expansion 0
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Table A4 displays those formation opportunities in the EPR sample that result in
a change in the government coalition and the reason for the break-up of the preceding
coalition. I define expansions as any recalibration that adds one additional member
to the government coalition. Whereas replacements identify cases in which the entire
government was turned out of office and succeeded by leaders from different ethnic groups,
exchanges indicate that representatives of at least one group were superseded by leaders
of another. Finally, I code breakups whenever one group is expelled from the government
without being replaced by another. The coup and rebellion columns indicate whether the
formation opportunity was preceded by either of these events in the previous year.
Table A5: Formation opportunities and change to prior coalition (initial government
excluded).
Count Share
Breakup 55 0.165
Replacement 18 0.054
Exchange 25 0.075
Expansion 80 0.240
No Change 155 0.465
Total 333 1
Table A5 indicates the counts and shares of different sources of change, and also adds
all formation opportunites without a change. By definition, the first formation opportu-
nity for each country is not included. Just less than half of all formation opportunities
do not result in a reconfiguration of the ethnic coalition. A quarter results in an expan-
sion, and 16% result from a breakup. The remaining 13% fall into complete replacements
or exchanges of individual members. As (Table A6) indicates, attempted and successful
coups (Powell and Thyne, 2011) or irregular leadership changes (Goemans, Gleditsch and
Chiozza, 2009) precede about one out of seven formation opportunities. Ethnic govern-
mental civil wars (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen, 2010; Wucherpfennig
et al., 2012) in the previous year are even less frequent.
Table A6: Formation opportunities in the EPR-periods-based samples and political vio-
lence in preceding year (initial government excluded).
Prior Violence
No Yes
Coups 283 50
Irregular Leadership Change 284 49
Governmental Civil War 302 31
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Figure A2 displays the distribution of formation opportunities over time in the two
samples. Formation opportunities to some extent track changes in the international sys-
tem such as the birht of states after decolonization or after the end of the Cold War.
Yet no five-year period suffers from too few observations. Figure A3 plots the share of
realized government types for the two samples underlying my analysis and a hypothetical
country-year sample. The distribution in the EPR-defined sample and the country-year
sample are relatively close to another. The institution-based sample indicates a higher
share of monoethnic majority governments and a lower share of oversized coalitions but
is otherwise quite similar to the other distributions.
Figure A2: Share of formation opportunities by country and five-year period in the
institution- and EPR-periods–based samples, 1946–2009.
Figure A4 takes a closer look at ethnic coalitions and plots their frequency during and
after the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the two period-bars are subdivided into those
coalitions that include a group with majority status (light) and those without (dark). Two
observations stand out: first, about half of all coalitions are formed in spite of the presence
of a majority group that could govern by itself if a 50% threshold would exist. Horowitz’
fear that groups with majority status automatically exclude minority groups does not
seem to be borne out by the data. Second, the share of coalitions among all governments
has increased after the end of the Cold War. One explanation for this pattern could
be an increase in power-sharing institutions in this period that stem from efforts by the
international community to resolve intrastate conflicts by negotiated means (Hartzell and
Hoddie, 2007). Boix and Svolik (2013) offer an alternative that is more in line with the
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Figure A3: Realized coalitions by different formation opportunity definitions, 1946–2009.
theoretical argument of this paper: the drop in super-power support that buttressed many
regimes during the Cold War has led to greater uncertainty about the relative balance of
power within dictatorships and increased the occurrence of governmental power-sharing.
Figure A4: Ethnic coalition composition during and after the Cold War.
A16
Table A7 and Figure A5 provide additional information on the global distribution
power-sharing institutions in 2008 and ethnic coalitions in 2009 (the same information
underlie Figure 1 in the main text). Neither display of the data offers any evidence for a
systematic relationship between institutions and coalitions.
Table A7: Formal power-sharing institutions in 2008 and ethnic coalitions in 2009 –
absolute and relative counts.
Ethnic
Coalitions
Power-Sharing
Institutions
No Yes Row Sum
No 12 55 67
0.092 0.420
Yes 14 50 64
0.107 0.382
Column Sum 26 105 131
χ2 = 0.323; d.f. = 1; p = 0.570
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Figure A5: Power-sharing institutions in 2008 (top) and ethnic power-sharing in 2009
(bottom).
Democracies
Autocracies
Power−Sharing Institutions
(a) Authoritarian and democratic powers-sharing institutions in 2008. Dictatorships in grey,
power-sharing-institutions striped. Data from Bormann and Golder (2013) and Cheibub, Gandhi
and Vreeland (2010).
Ethnic Hegemony
Ethnic Coalition
(b) Ethnic powers-sharing coalitions in 2009. Data from Cederman, Wimmer and Min (2010)
and Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013).
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Figure A6 depicts the distributions of cleavages across realized and potential govern-
ments. The first row depicts the count of distinct ethnic dimensions per government
whereas the second and third row each depict the count of all cleavages for all govern-
ments and oversized coalitions respectively. Each row demonstrates that the coalitions
leaders choose tend to have fewer cleavages than the potential alternative coalitions would
feature.
Figure A6: Ethnic cleavages in realized and potential governments.
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Table A8: Summary Statistics of Main Duration Analysis Variables.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Government Failure 6,524 0.027 0.163 0 1
Single-Group Majority 6,524 0.453 0.498 0 1
Oversized Coalition 6,524 0.377 0.485 0 1
Largest Group 6,360 0.836 0.370 0 1
Member Count 6,524 1.971 1.862 1 14
Cleavage Dimensions 6,524 0.281 0.450 0 1
Ethnic Gov. Conflict 6,524 0.121 0.326 0 1
Irregular Leader Change 5,876 0.040 0.196 0 1
Log(Leader Tenure) 5,876 1.731 0.823 0.000 3.871
Log(GDP p.c.) 6,524 3.480 0.542 2.043 5.049
GDP Growth 6,522 0.021 0.075 −0.654 0.887
Log(Population) 6,524 7.003 0.658 5.353 9.120
Parliamentary (DD) 6,524 0.165 0.371 0 1
Semi-Presidential (DD) 6,524 0.072 0.259 0 1
Presidential (DD) 6,524 0.137 0.344 0 1
Civilian (DD) 6,524 0.341 0.474 0 1
Military (DD) 6,524 0.211 0.408 0 1
PR (BG) 6,524 0.193 0.395 0 1
Majoritarian (BG) 6,524 0.139 0.346 0 1
Mixed (BG) 6,524 0.043 0.202 0 1
One-Party (Gandhi) 6,524 0.197 0.398 0 1
Multi-Party (Gandhi) 6,524 0.234 0.423 0 1
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6 Coalition Formation – Additional Tests
• Figure A7 plots the predicted probabilities of Model 1 for each government type
including grand coalitions, which are clearly less likely than oversized or single-
majority governments. Similar results obtain from Models 2 and 3.
• Table A9 replicates the results in Table 2 in the main text but use mixed logit models.
The only major difference is the statistical significance of the largest group mean
effect in Models A1 and A2. All other results indicate that the simply conditional
logit provides similar estimates to the unbiased mixed logit estimator.
• In order to alleviate concerns that the findings are driven by the selection of for-
mation opportunities, I estimate the specifications of Models 1 and 2 from Table 2
with conditional logit models on both the EPR-based sample and the institutions-
based sample described above. Except for the lack of statistical significance for the
estimated effect of oversized coalitions in Model A5, the results remain virtually the
same across the two samples.7
• The models in Table A11 assess how sensitive the results are to the removal of
cases where ethnicity is arguably less salient in politics such as OECD members
(Model A8), Western countries including those in the Americas, Western Europe,
Australia, and New Zealand (A9), post-Soviet member states (A10), and all states
outside Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Running the specification from Model 3
on the four subsets has no bearing on the conclusions reached in the main text.
• Table A12 presents four models. Model A12 counts all coalitions that include less
than 60% of the population as minimum-winning governments, and respectively
subtracts them from the oversized category. The estimated effect for minimum-
winning coalitions is now positive and statistically significant but continues to be
substantively and statistically weaker than that of single-member governments and
oversized coalitions. While minimum-winning coalitions according to this alternative
definition are more likely than minority governments they fail to reach the popularity
of secure majorities in ethnically divided societies. Model A13 restricts the analysis
to all states in which the largest group accounts for at most 60% of the population.
In these societies, ethnicity should be a highly relevant cleavage. The estimated
effects of oversized coalitions and count of cleavage counts hardly changes. This is a
strong signal that countries in which ethnicity might less salient do not unduly affect
7Israel is the only country that observes the formation of a minimum-winning coalition and while
it undergoes multiple changes in its bargaining environment, and therefore features multiple formation
opportunities in the EPR-based sample, it is institutionally stable throughout its history. It is thus only
included in the first year of its existence when it was not ruled by a minimum-winning coalition. As a
result of this perfect prediction, I cannot estimate the minimum-winning coalition effect in Models A5
and A7.
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the substantial conclusion of my analysis. Models A14 and A15 indicate different
post-conflict dummies. The former specification controls for the presence of two
ethnic groups within the government who had fought a past civil war against each
other. The latter model only distinguishes between government with the experience
of a prior war and those without. Although both estimated effects are negative,
implying that governments are less likely to include groups that have fought prior
civil wars, neither of them is significantly different from zero. Other specifications
that look at interactions between war experience and particular government types
return similarly insignificant results.
• Table A13 evaluates a number of alternative cleavage variable operationalizations.
Model A16 includes the count of all cleavages in a coalition rather than the sum of
at least one difference on linguistic, religious, and racial dimension. Model A17 di-
vides the sum of all cleavages in the coalition by the total number of cleavages in the
country to make sure that the cleavage results are not driven by very homogeneous
countries where the count is always small. Both models show strongly negative and
statistically significant effects for the respective variables, which implies that ethnic
elites prefer government with fewer cleavages to those with more cleavages. The
remaining two models in Table A13 assess whether or not the cleavage results are
driven by one of the underlying dimensions by including three variables that mea-
sure the fractionalization (A18) and polarization (A19) on each of the three ethnic
cleavage dimensions. I compute fractionalization as Frac = 1−∑Si=1 segsize2i and
polarization as Polar = 1 −∑Si 4 ∗ (12 − segsizei)2 ∗ segsizei (cf. Reynal-Querol,
2002, 33) where segsize captures the relative size of the cleavage segment i for
one group with S segments on one cleavage dimension. For example, a religiously
homogeneous group with multiple linguistic segments would have a religious frac-
tionalization score of 1 but a linguistic fractionalization score < 1. Although the
religious and racial dimensions exhibit a negative relationship with the likelihood
of coalition formation indicating that ethnic cooperation might indeed be less likely
along these two dimensions, none of the estimated effects is statistically significant
from zero.
• Four figures present the predicted probabilities of various government types under
different institutional frameworks, more specifically, democracies, anocracies, and
autocracies in Figure A8, dictatorships with and without ruling parties in Figure A9,
dictatorships with and without a parliament in Figure A10, and military versus
civilian regimes in Figure A11. As mentioned in the main text, the Figures do not
point to any differences in the patterns of coalition formation in ethnically divided
societies between the various institutional frameworks.
• Table A18 splits the formation sample into cases preceded by a negotatiated settle-
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ment in the past five years or not. I use two datasets, one by Hartzell and Hod-
die (2007) and updated by Mattes and Savun (2010), and the other by Högbladh,
Pettersson and Themnér (2011) to operationalize negotiated settlements. In post-
conflict settlement cases, the relationship between coalition types and the number
of cleavages within governments continues to point in the right direction but fails
to be statistically significant at the 5%-level – a likely result of the starkly reduced
number of formation opportunities. The relationship in non-settlment cases remains
robust.
• Table A19 includes models that assess the influence of non-state institutional capac-
ity on ethnic coalition formation. I assess differences between strongly and weakly
institutionalized party systems (Models A37&A38) with the help of an index of party
institutionalization from the Varieties fo Democracies project (Coppedge et al.,
2017). I split my sample of formation opportunities at the median of the index
(measured in country-years). Models A39&A40 test how elites create government
coalitions when faced with ongoing and past governments insurgencies, with data
from Kalyvas and Balcells (2010). Slater (2010) argues that communist insurgencies
have the power to threaten incumbent regimes and thus constitute strong non-state
organizations. In the case of either strong party systems or communist insurgen-
cies, the likelihood of elites choosing oversized coalitions over minority rule increases
relative to weak non-state institutions although the change in the difference is not
statistically significant. Formation opportunities with strong non-state institutions
are less likely to be associated with cross-cutting cleavages than those with weaker
institutions. Once more, the difference is not statistically significant.
• Table A20 includes models that assess the influence of state capacity on ethnic
coalition formation. I proxy strong states by low (versus high) settler mortality
(Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001) and high (versus low) values on the state
antiquity index by Bockstette, Chanda and Putterman (2002), which codes the
degree of centralized statehood on the territory of current-day states for the 39 half
centuries between 1 and 1950 C.E.. I again split each sample at the median. No
systematic differences with respect to oversized coalitions emerge between strong
and weak states. Whereas elites prefer oversized coalitions slightly more in cases of
settler mortality (and weaker states) the relationship reverses in states with a longer
history of statehood. Either way the differences are not statistically significant.
Reducing the number of cleavages per coalition consistently is more important in
weak states but once more the differences between strong and weak states fail to
reach statistical significance.
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Figure A7: Estimated government type probabilities based on Model 1 in Table 2 including
Grand Coalition.
Predicted Probabilities without Institutions
Minority Majority Minority Min.−Win. Oversized Grand
Single−Member Coalition
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Table A9: Mixed logit models of coalition formation in 133 states, 1946–2009.
(A1) (A2) (A3)
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Single-Group Maj. 3.023∗∗∗ 4.684∗∗∗ 3.365∗∗∗ 5.620∗∗∗ 2.955∗∗∗ 3.340∗∗∗
(0.664) (0.911) (0.718) (1.106) (0.750) (0.979)
M.-W. Coalition -0.017 -0.376 0.378 0.602 -0.336 0.400
(0.458) (0.604) (0.595) (0.765) (1.172) (1.410)
Oversized Coal. 1.579∗∗∗ -0.399 2.231∗∗∗ -0.749 2.327∗∗∗ 0.792∗
(0.345) (0.576) (0.394) (0.491) (0.451) (0.380)
Largest Group 1.215∗∗ 1.505∗∗∗ 1.107∗ 1.592∗∗∗ 0.390 -0.613
(0.426) (0.335) (0.441) (0.434) (0.443) (0.418)
No. of Groups -0.551∗∗ 1.231∗∗∗ -0.199 1.389∗∗∗ 0.011 1.207∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.167) (0.187) (0.288) (0.206) (0.166)
Cleavage Count -0.712∗∗ 1.212∗∗∗ -1.048∗∗∗ -1.149∗∗∗
(0.218) (0.247) (0.269) (0.249)
% of Incumbents 2.553∗∗∗ 1.578∗∗
(0.434) (0.558)
Formation Opportunities 467 467 328
Potential Governments 338591 338591 295288
` -1021.64 -990.213 -727.204
χ2 443.938 451.171 298.480
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A11: Conditional logit models on different geographic regions, 1946–2009.
(A8) (A9) (A10) (A11)
Non-OECD Non-West Non-Post-Soviet SSA & Asia
Single Majority 2.014∗∗∗ 2.057∗∗∗ 2.012∗∗∗ 1.979∗∗∗
(0.449) (0.498) (0.447) (0.569)
Minimum-Winning Coalition -0.194 -0.213 -0.284
(1.083) (1.075) (1.084)
Oversized Coalition 2.028∗∗∗ 2.055∗∗∗ 1.995∗∗∗ 1.958∗∗∗
(0.414) (0.439) (0.420) (0.447)
Largest Group 0.188 0.065 0.159 0.047
(0.307) (0.299) (0.297) (0.304)
Member Count -0.284 -0.298 -0.279 -0.304
(0.234) (0.236) (0.229) (0.245)
Cleavage Dimension Count -0.982∗∗∗ -0.839∗∗ -0.900∗∗∗ -0.749∗
(0.271) (0.294) (0.264) (0.298)
Formation Opportunities 300 265 310 241
Potential Governments 4488728 4488263 4488950 4487103
` -887.896 -866.981 -917.652 -824.518
χ2 85.968 76.935 93.681 70.340
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
A26
Table A12: Conditional logit models with alternative minimum-winning coalition thresh-
old, only states whose largest group encloses at most 60% of the population, and post-
conflict interactions.
(A12) (A13) (A14) (A15)
Single Group Majority 2.036∗∗∗ 1.753∗ 2.160∗∗∗ 2.165∗∗∗
(0.453) (0.787) (0.423) (0.421)
Minimum-Winning Coalition 1.156∗ -0.289 -0.176 -0.193
(0.496) (1.137) (1.072) (1.069)
Oversized Coalition 2.576∗∗∗ 1.838∗∗∗ 2.053∗∗∗ 2.035∗∗∗
(0.525) (0.541) (0.409) (0.404)
Largest Group in Government -0.135 0.238 0.153 0.165
(0.371) (0.328) (0.292) (0.291)
No. of Groups in Coalition -0.408 -0.161 -0.275 -0.260
(0.227) (0.279) (0.231) (0.232)
No. of Cleavage Dimensions -0.656∗∗ -0.799∗ -0.922∗∗∗ -0.916∗∗∗
(0.247) (0.365) (0.258) (0.256)
% of Last Government 0.641 3.396∗∗∗ 2.704∗∗∗ 2.604∗∗∗
(0.439) (0.872) (0.454) (0.461)
Past Civil War Opponents -0.322
(0.354)
Past Civil War -0.620
(0.366)
Observations 4489587 4457848 4489587 4489587
` -829.970 -634.949 -939.834 -937.343
χ2 117.121 47.014 112.814 111.838
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A13: Conditional logit model of coalition formation with India and alternative
ethnic cleavage operationalizations, 1946–2009.
(A16) (A17) (A18) (A19)
Single Group Majority 2.604∗∗∗ 2.239∗∗∗ 2.727∗∗∗ 2.799∗∗∗
(0.410) (0.434) (0.426) (0.419)
Minimum-Winning Coalition -0.708 -0.026 -0.860 -0.700
(1.023) (1.089) (1.084) (1.066)
Oversized Coalition 1.561∗∗∗ 2.210∗∗∗ 1.537∗∗∗ 1.680∗∗∗
(0.386) (0.425) (0.374) (0.377)
Largest Group in Government 0.122 0.179 0.206 0.092
(0.300) (0.294) (0.329) (0.291)
No. of Groups in Coalition 0.300 -0.273 -0.459 -0.405
(0.392) (0.230) (0.241) (0.226)
No. of Cleavages -0.525∗∗
(0.202)
Relative No. of Cleavages -2.190∗∗
(0.675)
Linguistic Fractionalization 1.003
(0.611)
Religious Fractionalization -0.575
(0.888)
Racial Fractionalization -0.610
(0.923)
Linguistic Polarization 0.007
(0.465)
Religious Polarization -0.671
(0.692)
Racial Polarization -0.321
(0.537)
% of Last Government 3.007∗∗∗ 2.782∗∗∗ 3.286∗∗∗ 3.007∗∗∗
(0.482) (0.458) (0.546) (0.499)
Formation Opportunities 333 333 333 333
Potential Governments 4489587 4489587 4489577 4489577
` -952.877 -947.682 -967.522 -968.386
χ2 101.294 94.446 90.419 90.042
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A14: Conditional logit models by regime and electoral system, 1946–2009. Basis
for Figures 4a and 4b.
(A20) (A21) (A22) (A23)
Dictatorship Democracy Majoritarian PR
Single Majority 1.957∗∗∗ 2.976∗∗∗ 2.448∗ 3.148∗∗∗
(0.512) (0.735) (1.138) (0.899)
Minimal-Winning Coalition -12.734∗∗∗ 1.625 -11.403∗∗∗ 3.201∗∗
(0.454) (1.190) (0.650) (1.198)
Oversized Coalition 2.061∗∗∗ 2.566∗∗∗ 1.480∗ 4.105∗∗∗
(0.454) (0.630) (0.624) (0.849)
Largest Group -0.045 0.607 1.261 -0.430
(0.356) (0.434) (0.668) (0.492)
Member Count -0.511∗ 0.142 0.308 -0.878
(0.239) (0.262) (0.285) (0.586)
Cleavage Dimension Count -0.674∗ -1.465∗∗∗ -1.022 -1.569∗∗∗
(0.273) (0.429) (0.649) (0.350)
Past Government Share 2.410∗∗∗ 3.880∗∗∗ 3.276∗∗ 4.277∗∗
(0.483) (1.064) (1.129) (1.566)
Formation Opportunities 208 174 60 51
Potential Governments 279316 4210271 4202860 7153
` -634.740 -288.601 -202.143 -59.246
χ2 2709.919 79.583 1317.648 71.404
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A17: Conditional logit models by period, 1946–2009.
(A31) (A32)
Cold War Post-Cold War
Single Majority 2.463∗∗∗ 1.928∗∗∗
(0.598) (0.498)
Minimum-Winning Coalition -11.959∗∗∗ 0.737
(0.488) (1.201)
Oversized Coalition 1.922∗∗∗ 2.154∗∗∗
(0.501) (0.553)
Largest Group 0.001 0.286
(0.469) (0.354)
Member Count -0.395 -0.177
(0.269) (0.281)
Cleavage Dimension Count -0.786∗ -1.033∗∗
(0.307) (0.316)
Past Government Share 2.674∗∗∗ 2.842∗∗∗
(0.470) (0.682)
Formation Opportunities 177 156
Potential Governments 3248403 1241184
` -490.816 -444.389
χ2 2051.933 60.417
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A18: Conditional logit models by negotiated settlements, 1946–2009.
(A33) (A34) (A35) (A36)
Hartzell & Hoddie UCDP
Settlement ∼Settlement Settlement ∼Settlement
Single Majority 1.641 2.227∗∗∗ 1.333 2.275∗∗∗
(0.980) (0.448) (0.841) (0.471)
Minimum-Winning Coalition -18.198∗∗∗ -0.087 -14.884∗∗∗ -0.077
(0.885) (1.076) (1.041) (1.051)
Oversized Coalition 1.711 2.142∗∗∗ 1.983 2.117∗∗∗
(1.030) (0.412) (1.149) (0.416)
Largest Group 0.195 0.155 0.392 0.118
(0.467) (0.311) (0.574) (0.314)
Member Count -0.385 -0.303 -0.420 -0.297
(0.503) (0.223) (0.548) (0.224)
Cleavage Dimension Count -0.621 -0.956∗∗∗ -0.598 -0.973∗∗∗
(0.437) (0.266) (0.367) (0.258)
Past Government Share 2.856 2.819∗∗∗ 3.026 2.784∗∗∗
(2.202) (0.459) (1.587) (0.458)
Formation Opportunities 26 307 39 294
Potential Governments 144369 4346046 140107 4350308
` -114.559 -855.016 -132.730 -834.940
χ2 2086.017 102.375 2805.978 91.957
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A19: Conditional logit models by institutional strength, 1946–2009.
(A37) (A38) (A39) (A40)
Party System Institutionalization Communist Insurgency
High Low Yes No
Single Majority 3.865∗∗∗ 1.482∗∗ 3.258∗∗ 2.058∗∗∗
(0.782) (0.472) (1.085) (0.454)
Minimum-Winning Coalition 2.421∗∗ -12.248∗∗∗ -10.568∗∗∗ -0.227
(0.862) (0.503) (0.951) (1.074)
Oversized Coalition 2.655∗∗∗ 2.182∗∗∗ 3.155∗∗ 1.938∗∗∗
(0.636) (0.576) (1.057) (0.426)
Largest Group 0.547 0.264 2.679∗∗∗ 0.050
(0.382) (0.344) (0.791) (0.290)
Member Count -0.183 -0.315 -0.564 -0.249
(0.325) (0.269) (0.350) (0.241)
Cleavage Dimension Count -0.682 -1.083∗∗∗ -0.675 -0.956∗∗∗
(0.424) (0.293) (0.384) (0.276)
Past Government Share 4.331∗∗ 2.647∗∗∗ 6.637∗∗ 2.667∗∗∗
(1.320) (0.655) (2.448) (0.461)
Formation Opportunities 131 161 45 288
Potential Coalitions 4364729 86935 1075311 3415104
` -371.995 -453.632 -146.821 -814.284
χ2 46.153 2369.294 1214.301 93.577
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table A20: Conditional logit models by state strength, 1946–2009.
(A41) (A42) (A43) (A44)
Settler Mortality State Antiquity
Low High High Low
Single Majority 1.487 1.516 3.351∗∗∗ 1.453∗∗
(0.773) (0.808) (0.816) (0.508)
Minimum-Winning Coalition -13.416∗∗∗ -8.825∗∗∗ 1.394 -12.405∗∗∗
(0.605) (0.967) (1.157) (0.458)
Oversized Coalition 1.742∗∗ 1.947∗ 2.124∗∗ 1.464∗∗
(0.663) (0.814) (0.702) (0.456)
Largest Group 0.038 1.820∗∗ 1.308∗∗ -0.168
(0.404) (0.588) (0.405) (0.309)
Member Count -0.152 0.004 -0.465 0.095
(0.364) (0.399) (0.326) (0.359)
Cleavage Dimension Count -0.985∗ -1.885∗∗∗ -0.508 -0.784∗
(0.391) (0.523) (0.304) (0.356)
Past Government Share 2.142∗∗∗ 2.163∗ 5.224∗∗ 1.603∗∗∗
(0.550) (1.031) (1.748) (0.362)
Formation Opportunities 150 73 143 160
Potential Coalitions 184570 4250365 4282233 80080
` -439.643 -206.826 -405.479 -441.272
χ2 1739.135 462.254 56.912 1360.921
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure A8: Estimated government type probabilities in democracies, anocracies, and
autocracies. Data from Polity IV.
Predicted Probabilities by Regime Type (Polity IV)
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Figure A9: Estimated government type probabilities in authoritarian regimes with and
without ruling parties. Data from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).
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Figure A10: Estimated government type probabilities in authoritarian regimes with and
without legislatures. Data from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).
Predicted Probabilities by Authoritarian Legislature
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Figure A11: Estimated government type probabilities in authoritarian regime type. Data
from Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010).
Predicted Probabilities by Authoritarian Regime
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7 Coalition Duration – Additional Tests
This section displays the full results of Table 3 from the main text in Table A21 and
additional Cox proportional hazards models to test the robustness of the cleavage vari-
able’s effect on coalition duration. Tables A22-A24 add additional controls to the main
specification in the text. Throughout these tests single-group majorities make for more
stable governments than oversized coalitions. The latter type of government, however,
become more stable as they add more members.
Tables A25-A28 add another specification that uses a continuous operationalization
of ethnic coalitions but otherwise adds the same controls in the same order as in the
main specification. Specifically, these models replace the coalition dummies and member-
ship count variable with the included group and population shares. The included group
share proxies the number of diverse ethnic elites that share power whereas the included
population share proxies the representativeness of the coalition.8 The two variables are
not independent as increasing the group share increases the population share and vice
versa. Yet countries with a majority-minority demography will feature high values on the
included population share variable and low values on the included group share measure.
Whereas countries with multiple minority groups and oversized coalitions will have high
values on both measures.
Generally, I expect governments with a high share of the included population to last
longer as rebellions provide less of a danger on the government. In contrast, increasing the
number of the included group share means an increasing risk of conflict within the coalition
and should decrease coalition survival. Gernally, the results bear out these expectations.
Below I will describe the individual models and focus on the effect of cleavage dimensions
in the coalition.
1. Tables A22 and A26 add additional institutional variables to the main specifications
in the text. Existing work has linked these these institutional variables either to the
likelihood of ethnic power-sharing or to the stability of governments in democratic or
autocratic regimes. However, none of these specifications alters the insights about
the relationship between cleavages and government stability reached in the main
text. Less diverse governments which include more cross-cutting cleavages survive
longer than more diverse governments which offer greater overlap with excluded
groups. In the following I briefly discuss the effects of the added control variables.
• Using data from the updated Democracy and Dictatorship (DD) dataset by
Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010)), Models A50 & A68 add the Polity IV
8I replace the share of included groups with the count of groups to better capture differences between
countries with a larger and smaller number of overall groups. This is not necessary in the main spec-
ification as the combination of the count of members and the oversized coalition dummy indicate the
proportion of groups in the coalition.
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index of democracy (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr, 2011) which reveals that
more democratic states experience more changes in the ethnic composition of
their governments though the relationship is only statistically significant at the
5%-level in Model A68..
• Models A51 & A69 again rely on DD data to assess differences between democ-
racies, autocracies with elected parliaments, and dictatorships without them
(e.g., Gandhi, 2008). Once more democracies are associated with more insta-
bility in the ethnic composition of the government.
• Finally, Models A52 & A70 distinguish authoritarian regimes according to
Geddes’, Wright’s, and Frantz’ conceptualization of authoritarian regimes by
adding controls for party-based, personalist, and military-based authoritarian
regimes (2013). Although the estimated effect for party-based regimes seems
to support their argument that such regimes survive longer, none of the effects
for the different autocratic institutions differs significantly from one another,
or from the baseline of democratic regimes.
2. Rather than evaluating distinct regime types, Tables A23 and A27 evaluate the
effect of institutional capacity on ethnic government stability and its relationship
with cleavage configurations. As discussed in the main text, non-state institutional
capacity could give excluded politicians the ability to activate cross-cutting cleavages
with the regime or create a counter-reaction by the state. In contrast, high state
capacity should only enable ruling elites to withstand attempts to split their support
base. The inclusion of these variables in the base specification (Table A23) reduces
the statistical significance of the estimated effect of the cleavage variable, this is not
the case in the continuous coalition variable models (Table A27). Since three out of
the four institutional strength variables drop a substantial number of cases from the
analysis, it is difficult to say whether or not the increased variability in the estimate
results from the smaller N or from a true confounding effect.
• Moreover, none of the institutional variables chosen here has a specifically
strong effect on governmental stability. Only states with a greater score on
state history index variable feature significantly fewer changes in the ethnic
constellations of their governments (Models A55 & A73).
• Ongoing and past communist rebellions, more institutionalized party systems,
and states with higher settler mortality rates fail to exert a statistically signif-
icant effect on government stability (Models A53-54, 56 & A71-72, A74).
3. The models in Tables A24 and A28 test the robustness of the cleavage-government
stability link when controlling for other sources of uncertainty. Again, the positive
and statistically significant link between a higher count of cleavages within the
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government coalition, i.e., a greater risk for cleavage realignment, and a greater
likelihood of government breakdown remains as predicted by my theory.
• Foreign occupations and changes in the Polity score do not affect government
stability in a statistically significant way (Models A57-58 & A75-76).
• A larger number of past civil wars is associated with more stability in the
ethnic composition of the government, possibly because information about the
fighting capacity of different ethnic groups has been revealed (Models A59 &
A77).
• Democratic and autocratic transitions as measured by the DD dataset imply
a higher risk of changes in the ethnic composition of the executive as expected
by most transition theorists (e.g., Boix, 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006).
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Table A21: Cox duration models of coalition failure, 1946-2009. Full results of Table 3.
(A45) (A46) (A47) (A48) (A49)
Single-Group Majority −1.320∗∗∗ −1.061∗ −0.960 −1.101 −1.021
(0.387) (0.507) (0.538) (0.606) (0.589)
Oversized Coalition −0.208 0.174 0.291 0.258 0.240
(0.323) (0.423) (0.453) (0.502) (0.501)
Largest Group −0.182 −0.331 −0.330 −0.327 −0.304
(0.339) (0.459) (0.485) (0.568) (0.547)
Member Count −0.099∗ −0.116∗ −0.105 −0.116 −0.117∗
(0.049) (0.049) (0.062) (0.061) (0.057)
Cleavage Dimensions 0.711∗∗ 0.765∗∗ 0.660∗ 0.531∗ 0.616∗
(0.231) (0.246) (0.267) (0.245) (0.253)
Civil War Ongoing 0.495∗∗ 0.354∗ 0.366∗ 0.365∗
(0.155) (0.156) (0.168) (0.160)
Irr. Leader Change 1.977∗∗∗ 1.962∗∗∗ 2.002∗∗∗ 1.970∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.211) (0.198) (0.202)
Log(Leader Tenure) 0.286∗∗ 0.218∗ 0.348∗∗ 0.233∗
(0.094) (0.089) (0.112) (0.099)
Log(GDP p.c.) −0.680∗∗ −0.830∗∗∗ −0.756∗∗∗
(0.229) (0.210) (0.221)
GDP Growth 1.165 1.349 1.112
(1.299) (1.283) (1.362)
Log(Population) −0.144 −0.238 −0.222
(0.200) (0.210) (0.189)
Parliamentary (DD) 1.936∗∗
(0.712)
Semi-Presidential (DD) 2.185∗∗
(0.696)
Presidential (DD) 0.867
(0.781)
Civilian (DD) 1.409∗
(0.643)
Military (DD) 1.318∗
(0.656)
PR (BG) 0.120
(0.449)
Majoritarian (BG) 0.822∗∗∗
(0.226)
Mixed (BG) −0.091
(0.736)
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One-Party (Gandhi) 0.298
(0.252)
Multi-Party (Gandhi) 0.353
(0.272)
Wald test: Pr(β1 = β2) <0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗
Observations 6,360 5,724 5,724 5,724 5,724
` −859.352 −680.765 −674.130 −663.093 −669.222
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. Displayed estimates are coefficients, not hazard ratios.
Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A22: Cox duration models of coalition failure, 1946-2009.
(A50) (A51) (A52)
Single Group Majority −1.017 −1.035 −0.927
(0.545) (0.540) (0.552)
Oversized Coalition 0.214 0.202 0.300
(0.464) (0.463) (0.466)
Largest Group −0.322 −0.280 −0.335
(0.498) (0.497) (0.510)
Member Count −0.105 −0.104 −0.099
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059)
Cleavage Dimensions 0.658∗ 0.682∗∗ 0.680∗∗
(0.264) (0.264) (0.262)
Civil War Ongoing 0.365∗ 0.350∗ 0.351∗
(0.159) (0.165) (0.164)
Irr. Leader Change 1.968∗∗∗ 1.942∗∗∗ 1.931∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.208) (0.208)
Log(Leader Tenure) 0.267∗∗ 0.281∗∗ 0.238∗∗
(0.094) (0.096) (0.089)
Log(GDP p.c.) −0.759∗∗∗ −0.773∗∗∗ −0.678∗∗
(0.230) (0.219) (0.232)
GDP Growth 1.156 1.225 1.172
(1.336) (1.348) (1.276)
Log(Population) −0.165 −0.208 −0.155
(0.198) (0.201) (0.197)
Polity 0.022
(0.013)
Democracy (DD) 0.377
(0.205)
Auth. Legislature (Gandhi) −0.051
(0.207)
Party Regime (GWF) −0.263
(0.220)
Personalist Regime (GWF) 0.058
(0.185)
Military Regime (GWF) 0.002
(0.228)
Wald test: Pr(β1 = β2) 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗
Observations 5,724 5,724 5,724
` −672.870 −672.324 −672.951
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. Displayed estimates are co-
efficients, not hazard ratios. Country-clustered standard er-
rors in parentheses.
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Table A23: Cox duration models of coalition failure, 1946-2009.
(A53) (A54) (A55) (A56)
Single Group Majority (β1) −0.963 −1.091∗ −1.181∗ −0.941
(0.532) (0.545) (0.524) (0.548)
Oversized Coalition (β2) 0.296 0.294 0.358 0.743
(0.451) (0.474) (0.413) (0.440)
Largest Group −0.318 −0.255 −0.119 −0.567
(0.483) (0.444) (0.485) (0.458)
Member Count −0.106 −0.103 −0.164∗ −0.140
(0.062) (0.072) (0.083) (0.089)
Cleavage Dimensions 0.675∗ 0.503 0.469 0.395
(0.264) (0.307) (0.260) (0.298)
Civil War Ongoing 0.350 0.415∗ 0.316 0.355
(0.186) (0.178) (0.180) (0.199)
Irr. Leader Change 1.953∗∗∗ 1.949∗∗∗ 2.052∗∗∗ 2.078∗∗∗
(0.209) (0.265) (0.209) (0.203)
Log(Leader Tenure) 0.220∗ 0.279∗ 0.233∗ 0.323∗
(0.092) (0.112) (0.105) (0.137)
Log(GDP p.c.) −0.695∗∗ −0.828∗∗ −0.817∗∗∗ −0.626∗
(0.232) (0.255) (0.244) (0.295)
GDP Growth 1.156 0.449 1.943 0.676
(1.293) (1.208) (1.279) (1.753)
Log(Population) −0.142 −0.273 0.121 −0.150
(0.197) (0.203) (0.229) (0.221)
Ongoing Communist Revolution 0.047
(0.355)
Past Communist Revolution −0.311
(0.387)
Party Institutionalization 0.335
(0.495)
State History Index −0.001∗∗
(0.0005)
Settler Mortality 0.105
(0.104)
Wald test: Pr(β1 = β2) 0.002∗∗ 0.003∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗ <0.001∗∗∗
Observations 5,724 5,033 5,105 3,175
BIC 1412.549 1121.606 1254.211 882.766
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. Displayed estimates are coefficients, not
hazard ratios. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A24: Cox duration models of coalition failure, 1946-2009.
(A57) (A58) (A59) (A60)
Single Group Majority −0.964 −0.971 −1.042∗ −0.987
(0.534) (0.544) (0.516) (0.540)
Oversized Coalition 0.287 0.279 0.240 0.286
(0.450) (0.461) (0.443) (0.449)
Largest Group −0.319 −0.324 −0.299 −0.322
(0.481) (0.492) (0.466) (0.489)
Member Count −0.106 −0.105 −0.104 −0.103
(0.062) (0.062) (0.067) (0.061)
Cleavage Dimensions 0.675∗ 0.659∗ 0.667∗ 0.666∗
(0.267) (0.268) (0.276) (0.262)
Civil War Ongoing 0.392∗ 0.352∗ 0.458∗∗ 0.333∗
(0.175) (0.157) (0.167) (0.168)
Irr. Leader Change 1.944∗∗∗ 1.968∗∗∗ 1.972∗∗∗ 1.761∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.211) (0.209) (0.241)
Log(Leader Tenure) 0.212∗ 0.220∗ 0.217∗ 0.243∗∗
(0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.089)
Log(GDP p.c.) −0.676∗∗ −0.680∗∗ −0.741∗∗ −0.697∗∗
(0.228) (0.229) (0.244) (0.228)
GDP Growth 1.224 1.164 1.169 1.096
(1.354) (1.300) (1.348) (1.302)
Log(Population) −0.144 −0.145 −0.028 −0.156
(0.199) (0.200) (0.212) (0.190)
Occupation (Polity) −1.020
(1.145)
Polity Change 0.027
(0.042)
Past Civil Wars −0.113∗
(0.054)
Democratic Transition 0.716
(0.411)
Autocratic Transition 0.815∗∗
(0.309)
Wald test: Pr(β1 = β2) 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.002∗∗ 0.001∗∗
Observations 5,724 5,724 5,724 5,724
` −673.420 −673.841 −672.405 −671.402
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001.Displayed estimates are co-
efficients, not hazard ratios. Country-clustered standard er-
rors in parentheses.
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Table A25: Cox duration models of coalition failure with continuous coalition variables,
1946-2009.
(A63) (A64) (A65) (A66) (A67)
Incl. Group Share 1.116∗∗ 1.443∗∗ 1.150∗ 1.262∗∗ 1.252∗
(0.408) (0.456) (0.466) (0.489) (0.491)
Incl. Population Share −2.949∗∗∗ −2.852∗∗∗ −2.490∗∗∗ −2.720∗∗∗ −2.649∗∗∗
(0.556) (0.642) (0.714) (0.772) (0.705)
Largest Group 0.728 0.732 0.646 0.673 0.667
(0.382) (0.448) (0.472) (0.515) (0.470)
Cleavage Dimensions 0.931∗∗∗ 0.935∗∗∗ 0.932∗∗∗ 0.831∗∗∗ 0.842∗∗∗
(0.205) (0.225) (0.219) (0.227) (0.220)
Civil War Ongoing 0.520∗∗ 0.436∗ 0.444∗ 0.458∗
(0.191) (0.187) (0.202) (0.186)
Irr. Leader Change 1.971∗∗∗ 1.962∗∗∗ 1.985∗∗∗ 1.960∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.215) (0.198) (0.204)
Log(Leader Tenure) 0.308∗∗ 0.264∗∗ 0.372∗∗ 0.293∗∗
(0.099) (0.097) (0.119) (0.107)
Log(GDP p.c.) −0.548∗ −0.673∗∗ −0.622∗∗
(0.234) (0.216) (0.224)
GDP Growth 1.468 1.634 1.395
(1.254) (1.260) (1.345)
Log(Population) −0.146 −0.212 −0.226
(0.170) (0.190) (0.164)
Parliamentary (DD) 1.690∗
(0.671)
Semi-Presidential (DD) 2.039∗∗
(0.651)
Presidential (DD) 0.550
(0.734)
Civilian (DD) 1.112
(0.590)
Military (DD) 0.958
(0.605)
PR (BG) 0.139
(0.430)
Majoritarian (BG) 0.876∗∗∗
(0.221)
Mixed (BG) 0.087
(0.828)
One-Party (Gandhi) 0.227
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(0.243)
Multi-Party (Gandhi) 0.370
(0.253)
Observations 6,360 5,724 5,724 5,724 5,724
` −855.858 −678.882 −674.424 −663.783 −668.967
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. Displayed estimates are coefficients, not hazard
ratios. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A26: Cox duration models of coalition failure with continuous coalition variables
regime type controls, 1946-2009.
(A68) (A69) (A70)
Group Share 1.165∗ 1.156∗ 1.131∗
(0.474) (0.470) (0.471)
Population Share −2.590∗∗∗ −2.592∗∗∗ −2.451∗∗∗
(0.707) (0.700) (0.707)
Largest Group 0.629 0.665 0.620
(0.471) (0.466) (0.466)
Cleavage Dimensions 0.926∗∗∗ 0.948∗∗∗ 0.954∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.213) (0.223)
Civil War Ongoing 0.445∗ 0.437∗ 0.416∗
(0.189) (0.193) (0.194)
Irr. Leader Change 1.973∗∗∗ 1.929∗∗∗ 1.946∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.209) (0.212)
Log(Leader Tenure) 0.327∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗
(0.101) (0.103) (0.096)
Log(GDP p.c.) −0.632∗∗ −0.642∗∗ −0.567∗
(0.229) (0.224) (0.231)
GDP Growth 1.473 1.544 1.463
(1.304) (1.305) (1.221)
Log(Population) −0.172 −0.217 −0.160
(0.168) (0.170) (0.168)
Polity 0.028∗
(0.013)
Democracy (DD) 0.423∗
(0.207)
Auth. Legislature (Gandhi) −0.080
(0.203)
Party Regime (GWF) −0.312
(0.221)
Personalist Regime (GWF) −0.040
(0.177)
Military Regime (GWF) −0.106
(0.257)
Observations 5,724 5,724 5,724
` −672.497 −672.019 −673.207
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. Displayed estimates are co-
efficients, not hazard ratios. Country-clustered standard er-
rors in parentheses.
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Table A27: Cox duration models of coalition failure with continuous coalition variables
and institutional strength controls, 1946-2009.
(A71) (A72) (A73) (A74)
Incl. Group Share 1.140∗ 1.199∗ 0.555 1.071
(0.459) (0.501) (0.452) (0.552)
Incl. Population Share −2.472∗∗∗ −2.436∗∗ −2.087∗∗ −1.710∗
(0.712) (0.806) (0.743) (0.840)
Largest Group 0.643 0.534 0.598 0.064
(0.476) (0.487) (0.467) (0.497)
Cleavage Dimensions 0.939∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 0.927∗∗∗ 0.853∗∗∗
(0.222) (0.237) (0.241) (0.250)
Civil War Ongoing 0.419∗ 0.463∗ 0.342 0.407
(0.204) (0.208) (0.209) (0.239)
Irr. Leader Change 1.959∗∗∗ 1.956∗∗∗ 2.011∗∗∗ 2.080∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.269) (0.223) (0.225)
Log(Leader Tenure) 0.267∗∗ 0.313∗∗ 0.296∗∗ 0.354∗
(0.098) (0.118) (0.107) (0.144)
Log(GDP p.c.) −0.555∗ −0.615∗ −0.649∗ −0.559
(0.236) (0.267) (0.274) (0.317)
GDP Growth 1.454 0.643 2.194 0.815
(1.250) (1.226) (1.231) (1.758)
Log(Population) −0.148 −0.244 −0.028 −0.093
(0.169) (0.193) (0.186) (0.214)
Ongoing Communist Revolution 0.068
(0.328)
Past Communist Revolution −0.163
(0.400)
Party Institutionalization 0.222
(0.507)
State History Index −0.001∗
(0.0005)
Settler Mortality 0.089
(0.128)
Observations 5,724 5,033 5,105 3,175
BIC 1408.662 1119.741 1260.21 887.9716
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. Displayed estimates are coefficients, not
hazard ratios. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table A28: Cox duration models of coalition failure with continous coalition variables
and uncertainty controls, 1946-2009.
(A75) (A76) (A77) (A78)
Incl. Group Share 1.109∗ 1.145∗ 1.025∗ 1.185∗
(0.471) (0.469) (0.470) (0.467)
Incl. Population Share −2.445∗∗∗ −2.482∗∗∗ −2.483∗∗∗ −2.444∗∗∗
(0.722) (0.724) (0.696) (0.698)
Largest Group 0.633 0.640 0.644 0.596
(0.472) (0.478) (0.465) (0.464)
Cleavage Dimensions 0.947∗∗∗ 0.929∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 0.941∗∗∗
(0.219) (0.219) (0.224) (0.213)
Civil War Ongoing 0.456∗ 0.433∗ 0.528∗∗ 0.428∗
(0.200) (0.189) (0.197) (0.195)
Irr. Leader Change 1.951∗∗∗ 1.967∗∗∗ 1.966∗∗∗ 1.778∗∗∗
(0.215) (0.215) (0.211) (0.247)
Log(Leader Tenure) 0.259∗∗ 0.266∗∗ 0.270∗∗ 0.284∗∗
(0.096) (0.096) (0.098) (0.097)
Log(GDP p.c.) −0.548∗ −0.549∗ −0.612∗ −0.557∗
(0.234) (0.234) (0.251) (0.234)
GDP Growth 1.504 1.464 1.498 1.410
(1.283) (1.253) (1.298) (1.256)
Log(Population) −0.152 −0.144 −0.061 −0.140
(0.170) (0.171) (0.175) (0.166)
Occupation (Polity) −0.764
(1.096)
Polity Change 0.024
(0.044)
Past Civil Wars −0.101
(0.054)
Democratic Transition 0.681
(0.420)
Autocratic Transition 0.735∗
(0.334)
Observations 5,724 5,724 5,724 5,724
` −674.061 −674.204 −672.975 −672.123
∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001. Displayed estimates are coefficients, not
hazard ratios. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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8 Narratives of government formation in Malaysia and
Indonesia
8.1 Case selection
To illustrate my argument further I describe coalition formation in Malaysia and Indonesia.9
These two case studies neither provide a causal test of my argument, nor were they crucial
in developing the theory. Instead they illustrate the plausibility of my theoretical argument.
Specifically, they show that three key parts of my argument operate in elites’ decisions to form
coalition: (1) elites form coalitions out of fear of future external challenges against their rule; (2)
ethnic groups do not provide homogeneous support to leaders but fracture internally, robbing
leaders of parts of their support base; (3) keeping cross-cutting cleavages inside the coalition
prevents supporter defection but cross-cutting cleavages with the opposition allow for supporter
defection. Additionally, the case studies reveal the relevance of non-ethnic cleavages. Although
it seems as if the same logic that I describe for ethnic cleavages operates in the presence of
non-ethnic divisions, additional research on their interplay is required before making firmer
conclusions.
Investigating the two Southeast Asian states allows me to exploit both within and between-
case variation on the outcome and the explanatory variables. Malaysia’s history since inde-
pendence provides examples of oversized ethnic coalitions and violent internal conflict between
ethnic groups included in the coalition. Rather than breaking the coalition, the risk of being
deposed by violence brought elites together. Whereas the Malaysian multiethnic coalition sur-
vived major challenges to its rule during the Asian Financial Crisis in the late 1990s, Suharto’s
monoethnic Javanese rule in Indonesia collapsed due to insufficient support among elites and
masses. Subsequent Indonesian governments formed oversized coalitions under the uncertainty
of democratization and frequent supporter defections.
Both Malaysia and Indonesia feature ethnic divisions along religious, racial, and linguistic
lines as well as non-ethnic cleavages. Religious and non-ethnic cleavages cross-cut the salient eth-
nic dimensions of race in Malaysia and language in Indonesia. The narratives below will explore
how reinforcing and cross-cutting cleavages affected coalition formation. While Malaysia experi-
enced democratic government first and then transitioned to competitive authoritarian rule, In-
donesia took the reverse path from authoritarian rule to multi-party democracy in the late 1990s.
Moreover, both states employed institutions that are commonly associated with elite power-
sharing in authoritarian regimes, yet Indonesia experienced monoethnic rule under Suharto. In
the following, I will describe several formation opportunities in each state, and explain how
the theoretical mechanisms discussed above help to explain elite choices. Subsequently, I will
evaluate several alternative explanations that fail to account for the observed dynamics.
9The following account heavily relies on Dan Slater’s 2010 book Ordering Power – Contentious Politics
and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia. I draw on other sources to both validate his account
and to highlight alternative interpretations.
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8.2 Malaysia
Although Malaysia never experienced changes to its multiethnic coalition composed of Malay,
Chinese and Indian elites, while excluding east-Malaysian Dayaks and Kadazans, several oppor-
tunities for reforming the composition of the government existed. Here I focus on the constitution
of the government around independence, its reformation after massive ethnic protest in 1969,
and the continuation of ethnic power-sharing during and after the Asian financial crisis. The
EPR dataset counts even more formation opportunities, for example, in 1963 when Singapore
joined the Malaysian federation. The unification increased the Chinese population share rela-
tively to the other ethnic groups, and thus triggered a change in the bargaining power of groups.
I refrain from describing these episodes here because they do not add fundamental insight to my
theoretical argument.
Independence: The origins of Malaysia’s multiethnic coalition government stem from the
massive threat of violence to elites around independence, and its latent persistence thereafter.
According to Slater (2010, 74), “Malaysia’s (...) robust ruling party coalition cohesive and sub-
servient military apparatus, and durable authoritarian regime have their shared historical roots
in elite responses to especially challenging pressures from below.” Ethnic divisions, specifically
the place of its Chinese minority which accounts for more than a quarter of the population, play
a central role in these pressures from below. Yet rather than excluding the minority Chinese
and their elites, the massive threat they posed through both urban protest and rural communist
insurgency prior to independence, led to collaboration between Malay and Chinese as well as
Indian elites in the Alliance during the last days of colonial rule and after independence.
The very threat of Chinese-Communist rebellion led the British colonial administration and
Malay elites to seek out Chinese coalition partners to help defeat the rebellion.10 Although the
Malayan Communist Party (MCP) almost exclusively mobilized Chinese recruits, many Chinese
elites themselves, who did not share communist convictions, felt threatened by the rebellion.
The cross-cutting anti-communist cleavage that united Malay and Chinese enabled multiethnic
collaboration (Slater, 2010, 89). The efforts it took to defeat the rebellion and the early electoral
successes that enabled access to patronage further demonstrated the usefulness of the coalition to
Malay and Chinese elites. Despite public suspicions about Chinese intentions and fears about a
loss in Malay status brought about by reconciliatory policies, ethnic leaders “had come to realize
that there was an urgent need for co-operation between the Malays and non-Malays in order to
ward off racial conflicts in Malaya” (bin Tadin, 1960, 72).
Autocratic Reversal: In the dozen years following independence, the Alliance parties con-
tinued to gain majorities at the ballot box against opposition parties slowly increasing in strength.
Ethnic outbidding threatened support for the Alliance parties and triggered urban riots. Malay-
Islamic elites, formerly part of the Alliance’s United Malayl National Organization (UMNO)
10Slater argues that the Malay response of coalition formation was due to the combined threat of
ethnic and class rebellion. Yet Stenson (1974, 126) highlights that “although elements of class conflict
were essential to the Malayan Communist Party’s genesis, the full magnitude of the Party’s support
derived more from its ethnic than its class base.”
A52
founded their own party, the Pan-Malayan Islamic Organization (PAS) in 1951. Threatening
cleavage reconfiguration by highlighting religious divisions to non-Muslims brought them a sub-
stantial share of votes (Crouch, 1996, 18). Nevertheless the Alliances’ seat share in parliament
never fell below 60% of seats (Slater, 2010, 121), at least in part because the coalition offered
representation to Islamic groups.
It was the uncertainty induced by decreasing majorities and the threat of more violence after
heavy urban riots that led the ruling elites to abandon electoral democracy in 1969. Although
the anti-Chinese riots were triggered by an electoral result that many Malays interpreted as
Chinese defection from the Alliance, and thus a monoethnic grab for power, Malay, Chinese,
and Indian elites reconstituted their oversized coalition by abandoning democratic rules rather
than expelling Chinese elites (Slater, 2010, 123). In fact, instead of downsizing the coalition, the
opposite happened and the coalition enlarged its membership on both the elite and the mass level
(Crouch, 1996, 33; Liow and Leifer, 2014, 102). Slater (2010, 147) describes how “economic elites,
communal elites, and middle classes join[ed] state officials in broad support of more authoritarian
politics” in the newly constituted Barisian Nasional (BN).
Having recognized the threat of cleavage reconfiguration, the BN implemented an active
program of institutionalizing political Islam within its organizational structure throughout the
1970s and 1980s. “The bureaucratization of religious authority . . . allowed for the control of
increasing religious diversity perceived as a challenge to the Administration’s authority” (Nair,
1997, 34). This is not to say that Muslim elites have no say in the coalition. Quite the opposite
holds true as “UMNO-led regime [enjoys] broad support among Muslim elites” (Slater, 2010,
149). In line with my second hypothesis, the ethnic leaders in Malaysia incorporate the, albeit
minor, cross-cutting religious and territorial cleavages into their coalition to prevent cleavage
reconfiguration, while excluding groups such as the Dayaks and Kadazans from East Malaysia
without any territorial and religious overlap.
Asian Financial Crisis: The Asian Financial Crisis of 1998 presented a perfect storm for
any autocratic regime, and brought down dictators and their ruling coalitions in Indonesia and the
Philippines. Despite increasing nepotism and internal challenges to the UMNO-Malay leadership
of the BN during the crisis, the multiethnic coalition survived and even thrived thereafter. There
are two interpretations of this unlikely success, which are both broadly in line with my argument.
For one, the oversized multiethnic coalition of the BN was strong enough to survive even
defections by such high-level Malay leaders as Deputy Prime Minister Ibrahim Anwar, who was
widely seen as the likely successor to long-time Prime Minister Mahatir. As predicted by my
second hypothesis, Anwar tried to capitalize on his popular support and emphasized religious
cleavages to take over power from Mahatir. However, “[t]he extraordinary cohesion of UMNO
and the BN left Anwar virtually friendless at the elite level,” and he “faced enormous structural
difficulties in attracting and mobilizing support from the kinds of communal elites . . . who had
driven democratic uprisings in the Philippines and Indonesia” (Slater, 2010, 214). The oversized
multiethnic coalition survived Malay voter defections motivated by demands for democratization
through continued Chinese support. This support stemmed “from ethnic protection [rather] than
from economic provision” (Slater, 2010, 221). The Chinese did not love the regime but they feared
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potential violence that coalition breakdown had brought about in Indonesia.
Emphasizing class divisions over ethnic cleavages, Pepinsky (2009) offers a different account
that points to the UMNO’s ability to safeguard the economic interests of its Malay constituency.
Uniting the preferences of Malay labor and fixed capital in its policy response to the financial cri-
sis, at the expense of Chinese mobile capital, allowed the regime to retain its largest constituency
(119-151). Pepinsky’s interpretation highlights the importance of including cross-cutting cleav-
ages, in this instance Malay economic segments, into the ruling coalition to forestall supporter
defections. It also points to unsuccessful attempts by excluded elites to shift the political com-
petition to religious cleavages to unseat the BN (ibid. 217). In spite of its focus on class-based
divisions, Pepinsky’s account still references the BN’s tactic of emphasizing the potential of racial
violence against the Chinese should it lose power (ibid. 218). Agreeing that non-Malay “voters
did contribute to the BN’s success in the 1999 elections,” Pepinsky downplays multiethnic sup-
port and underlines the persistent loyalty of Malay supporters, who profited from the regime’s
policies (224).
The three formation opportunities in Malaysia support my argument that (i) political elites
form oversized coalitions in anticipation of future challenges, that (ii) coethnic defection is one of
those challenges, and that (iii) cross-cutting cleavages inside the coalition help elites to remain in
power. Although cross-cutting cleavages in Malaysia are predominantly non-ethnic, the threat of
cleavage reconfiguration and subsequent supporter defection affects coalition choices throughout
all three periods.
8.3 Indonesia
Leaders in Indonesia, unlike Malaysia, prefered exclusive Javanese rule under the guise of all-
Indonesian nationalism over ethnic power-sharing until the early 2000s. Although ethnic rebel-
lions broke out on peripheral islands after independence, none of these constituted a sufficient
threat to Javanese elites in Jakarta. When faced with a strong, multiethnic communist uprising,
the already powerful military took control and literally eliminated the communist threat in a
deadly politicide. Absent a strong challenger to Javanese hegemony, the regime relied primarily
on military force to uphold its rule. Yet internal divisions emerged over time among Javanese
elites on the religious dimension, and the Asian Financial Crisis in unison with multiple ethnic
rebellions brought down Suharto’s New Order in 1998. Then, cross-cutting ethnic cleavages and
constant supporter defection compelled elites to form oversized coalitions.
As in Malaysia, the EPR dataset reports multiple formation opportunities due to changes
in the political relevance or relative population share of ethnic groups in Indonesia. Yet the
ethnic composition of the government only changes after the Suharto regime collapses. I focus
on four crucial formation opportunities: (i) independence, (ii) the end of democracy in 1959, (iii)
Suharto’s ascendance to power in 1965, and (iv) the return of democratic rule after the Asian
Financial Crisis.
Independence: As opposed to the joint struggle of colonial masters and subjects against
ethnic-communist rebellion in Malaysia, Indonesian elites fought for independence against the
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Dutch. Although this nationalist struggle gave a sense of unity particularly to Javanese elites,
Dutch divide-and-rule tactics that favored peripheral ethnic groups such as the Ambonese planted
the seeds for lasting center-periphery divisions (Slater, 2010, 106-108). Aided by the United
States, Indonesia’s pursuit of independence was successful and removed most uncertainty about
elite’s grasp on power. Although the resulting period of parliamentary democracy saw com-
munist, Islamic, secular, and non-Javanese parties grapple for power in ever-shifting coalitions,
President Sukarno’s position was not in doubt. Moreover, Javanese infighting was possible be-
cause natural sea barriers and weak organization kept ethnic rebellion in the periphery from
exerting a serious violent threat to Java (ibid. 112).11 Absent a potent challenger from within
the Javanese group, President Sukarno relied on the military to crush external challenges. The
military proved strong enough to overcome internal defections by non-Javanese army members
and US-aid to ethnic rebellions. In line with my theory, Indonesia’s rulers’ coercive capacity was
strong enough to exclude leaders of non-Javanese groups from power.
Guided Democracy My theoretical argument also suggests that oversized coalitions can
serve as an insurance against coups because they diffuse power (cf. Arriola, 2009). Why, then,
did Sukarno not expand the ruling coalition beyond the Javanese dominated military? In fact,
he tried by seeking support from the previously weak Communist Party of Indonsia (PKI), which
increased greatly in size “under the patronage and protection of Sukarno himself” (Slater, 2010,
137). After abandoning democratic rule in 1959, the PKI expanded from urban Javanese centers
to the countryside and into the periphery of the country. “Alone among the political parties the
PKI sought to appeal to the populace across ethnic, religious, regional, and cultural boundaries”
(Mortimer, 1974, 109). By 1964, its membership reached about twenty million.
Since the PKI’s ideology and actions were challenging traditional religious authorities and
high-ranking army officers by demanding large-scale land reform, Sukarno’s main power base,
the army leadership resisted full inclusion of the Communist Party. Sukarno’s affiliation with the
communists proved to be his downfall. A failed coup attempt against the army leadership had
the ostensible goal to protect Sukarno from right-wing takeover. PKI leaders’ involvement in the
coup gave the military justification to annihilate about 500,000 communist party members and
sympathizers between October 1965 and March 1966.12 The PKI fielded no rebel army and the
coup was quickly defeated. In other words, it posed no immediate threat to army rule (Roosa,
2006, 22). Instead it was the fear among Javanese army leaders and Muslim elites of a communist
takeover. This uncertainty stemmed from the sheer size of the PKI and triggered the deadly
army response (ibid., 205-206).
Suharto’s New Order: Leading the counter-insurgency/killing campaign of the army against
the PKI, General Suharto replaced Sukarno as de facto leader in 1966. As in Malaysia, the PKI’s
attempt to grab power united “class and communal conflict” (Slater, 2010, 182). The perception
11Slater highlights that it is not the intensity but the type of external challenge that lacked a credible
threat to Javanese elites. Ethnic rebellion without class-conflict, he argues, fails to bring about inclusive
elite cooperation at the center.
12Some observers report up to two million victims (e.g., Anderson, 2001, 9).
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of a massive threat forged cooperation across various divisions between Javanese elites, bringing
together the army leadership, conservative Muslim and Christian clerics, and nationalist-inspired
students. Rather than shared economic interests, the members of Suharto’s New Order ruling
coalition were united by fear of the communist-communal threat (ibid. 180). Bringing together
such a coalition thus follows the spirit of my theoretical argument, if it were to go beyond ethnic
cleavages. Yet unlike in Malaysia, where elites decided to ally with the ethnic group most asso-
ciated with communism, the Indonesian army succeeded at completely eliminating the threat of
its enemy. Without the unifying organization of the Communist party, smaller Indonesian ethnic
groups posed no threat to Javanese dominance buttressed by massive military superiority.
According to Slater (2010, 183) “The successive pressures of regional and leftist unrest
had transformed the Indonesian military from a fragmented post-guerrilla warfare force into
a formidable power center.” Yet the very strength of the army was to the downfall of Suharto.
“[T]he government weakened its own support by its complete success in destroying the organized
left in 1965-66” (Anderson, 1978, 6; as quoted in Slater, 2010, 181). One after another, Suharto’s
non-army coalition partners abandoned the regime voluntarily or were edged out (Aspinall, 2005,
38-39). Since both conservative Muslim clerics and nationalist students were Javanese they did
not fear outright discrimination in daily life as Chinese Indonesians did, but they were not
content with the regime either. Despite important countervailing theoretical predictions (e.g.,
Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Magaloni, 2008), neither Golkar, the regime’s ruling party, nor the
authoritarian legislature managed to guarantee power-sharing among Javanese elites (Pepinsky,
2009, 188; Slater, 2010, 188).
Asian Financial Crisis and Democratization: Once Indonesia’s economy collapsed in
1998, its ruling coalition had long crumbled: On the elite level, “the factional and institutional
frictions the crisis exposed had been decades in the making” (Slater, 2010, 206). On the mass
level, protests by Javanese Muslims and students as well as excluded ethnic groups erupted
throughout the Indonesian archipelago. Armed rebellion in East Timor, Aceh, and West Papua
intensified. Faced with such wide-spread opposition from both their Javanese coethnics and a
range of non-Javanese groups, the army did not defend Suharto.
Yet, rather than overthrowing the entire miltary leadership in what would have been a bloody
revolution, political leaders representing the entire political spectrum and from multiple ethnic
backgrounds opted to form an oversized coalition. Since the perception of Indonesia’s political
leaders and their subsequent coalition choices during the Asian Financial Crisis captures the
essence of my argument, it is worth quoting Horowitz’ (2013, 48) description of events at length:
Beyond this, the leaders may have feared, and probably did genuinely fear, an emerg-
ing civil war. There was much in Indonesian history, and even in recent weeks and
months, to bring that fear to life. Even in a conflict short of civil war, they could
not be sure of the outcome. . . .Then, finally, there was the uncertainty of political
outcome even if the revolutionists had won, had the leaders sided with them. If events
moved in an ever-more-radical direction, who could say that these more or less mod-
erate political leaders could continue to ride the tiger that was the swelling Jakarta
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crowd, with its uncertain slogan of reformasi total and its demand for a “People’s
Committee” to replace the legislature? Where this movement could lead no one could
tell.
The result was broad consensus for democratic elections, cooperation between old and new
elites, and multiethnic government in oversized coalitions (ibid., e.g., 102 & 185). The initial
fear of bloody revolution led elites to make institutional choices that would further promote
collaboration subsequently. More than institutional pressures though, cross-cutting ethnic (and
non-ethnic) cleavages enabled frequent voter defection. “As membership categories could shift,
what seemed like sharp lines at one time might blur at another” (ibid. 37). Overlapping identity
segments between ethnic groups, in turn, brought about “multipolarity in the legislature, and
that laid the foundation for cooperative politics” (ibid. 86). Yet grand coalitions were not on
the table. Ethnic groups such as the Ambonese with religious, linguistic, and racial differences
towards other Indonesians remained excluded.
As in Malaysia, the Indonesia case demonstrates that (i) uncertainty about future challenges
drives elites into oversized multiethnic coalitions, (ii) that enabling cross-cutting cleavages with
the opposition drives cleavage reconfiguration and the downfall of elites (Suharto), and (iii) that
leaders were far more attentive to include cross-cutting cleavages after Suharto’s downfall to
avoid losing their majority in parliament or at the ballot box.
8.4 Alternative explanations
The preceding narratives of coalition formation reveal that fear of future violent challenges led
leaders to form oversized multiethnic coalitions in Malaysia from independence until today, and
in Indonesia after the end of the New Order. They also demonstrate how crosscutting cleavages
motivate leaders to include specific ethnic groups into the coalition but not others. This section
will show that the two cases do not support alternative explanations. Comparing Malaysia’s
and Indonesia’s formation opportunities, I discuss theories such as (i) the commitment problem
logic as articulated by Roessler (2011), (ii) ethnic outbidding as emphasized by Rabushka and
Shepsle (2008) (iii) the cooperation-incentivizing impact of formal institutions in dictatorships
(e.g., Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Magaloni, 2008; Boix and Svolik, 2013), and (iv) interethnic
trust resulting from cross-cutting cleavages.
One rival explanation to my theoretical account identifies uncertainty about coalition part-
ners’ intentions as the key driver of coalition dynamics. According to Roessler (2011), the
attempts by elites from different ethnic groups to grab power and the counter-measures taken by
other coalition partners create a worsening security dilemma that erodes trust, and eventually,
coalition failure. As a result, many governments should consist of monoethnic elites rather than
multitethnic coalitions, in which the risk of coups and elite defections reaches presumably higher
levels. In both cases elite competition within the ruling coalition occurs at multiple occasions.
In Suharto’s Indonesia, Muslim and nationalist leaders who originally supported Suharto were
edged out of the ruling coalition. In Malaysia, the UMNO split in the 1950s, again in the 1980s,
and during the Asian Financial Crisis Prime Minister Mahatir faced an internal challenge by
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his deputiy Anwar. As opposed to Roessler’s account, these defections came from Javanese
and Malays, that is coethnics of the leader/dominant group. More importantly, none of these
cases led to coalition failure in the sense that members of one ethnic group were completely
expelled from the government. Despite the difficult beginnings of the Alliance government in
Malaysia, Crouch (1996, 32) even observes that “top party leaders not only cooperated closely in
government but became warm personal friends” between 1957 and 1969. In sum, commitment
problems between different elites and between different ethnic groups occurred in both Indonesia
and Malaysia, yet the fear of external challenges outweighed internal competition.
Whereas the commitment problem described by Roessler plays out on the elite level, others
highlight the difficulty of elites to maintain the support of their supporters when compromising
in multiethnic coalitions (Horowitz, 2000, 365). Challenged by rivals with the same ethnic
background who promise to provide more benefits to the masses if elected, the moderate position
of compromise across ethnic lines becomes untenable, and multiethnic coalitions break (Rabushka
and Shepsle, 2008). Ethnic outbidding indeed occurred in Malaysia during the 1950s and 1960s
(Crouch, 1996, 19), and attracted votes but did not unseat the government for two related
reasons. For one, leaders and supporters of the governing parties from each of the three large
ethnic groups were more afraid of violence than they were unsatisfied with receiving too little from
governing parties. For another, the lesson they took from escalating urban violence in 1969 was
not to expel their coalition partners but to abandon electoral competition. Rather than forming
a monoethnic Malay-dominated government, elites expanded the ruling coalition (Crouch, 1996,
33). Additionally, those parties that engaged in ethnic outbidding did not mainly appeal to the
main racial faultline but rather emphasized Islamic identity to reconfigure cleavages. Since the
ruling coalition already represented Muslims qua race, the outbidding strategy at most got the
opposition 40% of the vote. Including all ethnic groups with even minor Muslim segments into
the government, thwarted the opposition strategy.
A third rival explanation attributes power-sharing in Malaysia and later in democratic In-
donesia to the prevailing institutional framework. Although Horowitz (2000, 433) predicts that
single-parties in dictatorships open up “opportunities for ethnic and even subethnic cliques and
factions to attain hegemonic influence,” Malaysia’s coalition after 1969 fits well into theories of
authoritarian power-sharing. Gandhi and Przeworski (2006, 2007), Magaloni (2008) and others
predict that ruling parties such as the Barisian Nasional incentivize cooperation between elites.
While the BN certainly facilitated coalition survival in Malaysia, the multiethnic coalition be-
tween Malays, Chinese, and Indians formed earlier. Importantly, it emerged under democratic
institutions that should have promoted factionalism: “Considering the geographic fragmentation
of Malayan politics and the absence of a party-list voting system, one should have expected
(...) weak parties and localized electoral fiefdoms. . . ” (Slater, 2010, 92). Similarly, in Indonesia,
Suharto’s ruling party, Golkar, did not lead to or keep power-sharing even among Javanese elites.
In democratic systems, proportional representation and parliamentary government, or the alter-
native vote supposedly induce power-sharing (Lijphart, 2002; Horowitz, 2002). Yet Indonesian
multiethnic power-sharing emerged in direct response to the revolution and thus prior to consti-
tutional reforms after the Asian Financial Crisis. Even then, elites chose presidential democracy
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and attempted to introduce electoral rules that would decrease party fragmentation, and thus
the incentives for coalition government (Horowitz, 2013, 27). Neither country then provides clear
support for institutional theories.
Finally, in Malaysia and Indonesia cleavages that cross-cut ethnic groups may create greater
trust between their members, which eases elites’ ability to compromise. In fact, Horowitz (2013,
6) argues that “the structure of [Indonesian] cleavages . . . proved to be felicitous” for multiethnic
collaboration due to their ability to cross-cut major group lines. Yet these cross-cutting cleavages
coexist with high levels of suspicion between different ethnic groups. Immediately following his
earlier statement, Horowitz (2013:6) concedes that Indonesia has strongly felt ethnic, religious,
and cultural differences. . . there is a plethora of ethnic groups, and some of their relationships
can become quite conflictual.” In Malaysia the relationship between Chinese and Malayans is, if
anything, even more polarized than in Indonesia, despite small overlapping religious segments.
When the UNMO was first founded, Slater (2010, 78) reports a “palpable sense of ethnic anxiety
[that] explains the fervor with which mobilization occurred” among the Malay masses. According
to bin Tadin (1960, 72), “[t]he Malay Press was generally suspicious” of Malay leaders’ move to
open up the UMNO to non-Malays. Later the ethnic origins of the constituent parties would
make it difficult to come together in the Alliance: “Certainly the two leading figures, UMNO’s
Onn bin Jaafar and the MCA’s Tan Cheng Lock, were not brought into the partnership by any
sense of natural affinity” (Slater, 2010, 92). As discussed above, scepticism and even fear of
Malay intentions was even more prevalent among the Chinese, who chose to participate in the
multiethnic coalition despite playing second fiddle to the UMNO and their Malay base. The
alternative of exclusion and the threat of violence was simply worse.
In sum, both Indonesia and Malaysia sometimes displayed elements of alternative expla-
nations for coalition formation. Yet none of these four alternative theories affected coalition
formation as it should have. Commitment problems were present in Indonesia and Malaysia
but they affected elites from the same ethnic groups and they did not lead to monoethnic gov-
ernment. Institutional incentives for power-sharing also existed in both cases, but only after
coalitions formed in authoritarian Malaysia and democratic Indonesia, or they failed to deliver
as under Suharto’s rule. Finally, cross-cutting cleavages exist in both cases and created fluidity
among groups but they did not seem lead to greater trust among group members or their leaders.
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